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1957 
STATE COURTS, THE RIGHT TO VOTE, AND THE 
DEMOCRACY CANON 
Rebecca Guthrie* 
 
Entire elections can be determined by the way a state judge chooses to 
interpret an election statute.  And yet, there has been little scholarly attention 
on how judges construe statutes regulating elections at the state level.  This 
Note begins to redress that lack of attention by undertaking an in-depth 
analysis of one interpretive tool historically invoked by state courts.  The 
“Democracy Canon” is a substantive canon urging courts to liberally 
construe election statutes in favor of voter enfranchisement.  By conducting 
a review of both historical and modern references to the Democracy Canon 
by state courts, this Note argues that courts have become less willing to rely 
on the Democracy Canon in recent decades.  At the same time, codification 
of the Democracy Canon, and perhaps other substantive canons, by state 
legislatures may alleviate most concerns of courts about using substantive 
canons and may be the solution to revitalize the Democracy Canon. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most of us would assume that we have fulfilled the ideals of democracy as 
soon as we exit the voting polls.  By submitting our ballots, we have 
expressed our will and the democratic process is complete.  However, in the 
words of playwright Tom Stoppard, “[i]t’s not the voting that’s democracy, 
it’s the counting.”1  With a spike in the number of election disputes over the 
last twenty years,2 state courts are playing an increasingly important role in 
the outcome of elections.3  Courts determine who can vote, for whom we can 
vote, and which votes will count.  For example, courts have determined the 
outcomes of entire elections by interpreting words and phrases like “obvious 
 
 1. TOM STOPPARD, JUMPERS 35 (1972). 
 2. As of 2008, the number of election cases in state courts had tripled since the late 1990s. 
See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 89 (2009). 
 3. For an analysis of how state court election decisions shape the constitutional right to 
vote, see generally Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 
(2016). 
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error,”4 “overvote,”5 and “must.”6  With courts having so much power in 
determining elections, how can citizens make sure that the democratic 
process remains in their hands and not the judiciary’s?  One answer lies with 
understanding how these courts interpret and apply relevant election statutes. 
Most states have constitutions that ensure the right to vote (either 
implicitly or explicitly),7 a legislature that enacts laws outlining election 
procedures,8 election officials who carry out those procedures, and judges 
who interpret and apply the procedures whenever there is a dispute.  Thus, 
election disputes will very often be resolved by courts interpreting election 
statutes.9  How courts interpret these can, in some instances, completely 
nullify a vote, replacing the citizens’ choice with the court’s own opinion of 
the correct result.  This Note seeks to understand whether judicial statutory 
interpretation has actually ensured that the democratic process remains with 
the people. 
Part I of this Note explores the legal background of both statutory 
interpretation by courts and election laws enacted by legislatures.  These two 
worlds converge when a state legislature codifies canons of construction 
specific to the interpretation of its election laws.  The most prominent of these 
canons is the “Democracy Canon,” which is examined more thoroughly in 
Part I.B.  Part I.C explains the methodology used in this Note to analyze state 
courts’ and legislatures’ employment of the Democracy Canon. 
This Note provides both a longitudinal and latitudinal review of the 
Democracy Canon.  Part II undertakes the longitudinal review, looking at 
every case from the highest courts of four states that applied the Canon since 
the nineteenth century.  By providing an in-depth historical analysis, this Part 
highlights that references to the Democracy Canon in modern times are more 
likely to lead to disenfranchisement10 of voters than was the case before 
1960.11 
Part III seeks to understand this shift by exploring state court decisions 
invoking the Democracy Canon from all fifty states after 2000 (the latitudinal 
review).  This dataset confirms that courts are almost as likely to 
disenfranchise voters as to enfranchise them when courts discuss the 
Canon.12  There are several justifications in the state courts’ reasons for 
rejecting the Democracy Canon, including the rise of textualism, the impact 
of other state legislative interests, and judicial concerns about infringing on 
the legislature.13  Lastly, Part IV suggests that state legislatures can revitalize 
 
 4. See Coleman v. Ritchie, 762 N.W.2d 218, 225 (Minn. 2009). 
 5. See Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 2007). 
 6. See Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1239 (Fla. 2000). 
 7. See infra note 15. 
 8. See infra note 16. 
 9. In 2008, almost 71 percent of election cases in state courts were purely questions of 
statutory interpretation. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 91. 
 10. For an overview of techniques historically used to disenfranchise certain voters, see 
generally MICHAEL DIMINO ET AL., VOTING RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 1–8 (2d ed. 2015). 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
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the Democracy Canon by codifying it as a statutory rule of construction.14  
This Note concludes by offering some reasons for why codification of 
substantive canons in general would mitigate judges’ concerns about 
employing such tools when undertaking a statutory analysis. 
I.  THE INTERSECTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND ELECTIONS 
The right to vote is almost entirely state-based, either guaranteed in state 
constitutions15 or protected in state legislation.16  Thus, state judges “are 
often the main actors in defining the constitutional right to vote” by 
interpreting the state’s constitution, statutes, and regulations.17  For this 
reason, state election laws offer an ideal playing field for analyzing state 
statutory interpretation methods.  This field is even more bountiful in that it 
allows us to consider the impact of codified rules of construction.  One of 
these codified canons is the Democracy Canon, first discussed by Richard 
Hasen.18  The Democracy Canon is a substantive canon that calls for courts 
to interpret election statutes “with a thumb on the scale in favor of voter 
enfranchisement.”19  The Democracy Canon, which several state legislatures 
have codified as a legislatively mandated rule of construction,20 provides 
ample opportunity to study the intersection of statutory interpretation and 
election law.  To fully understand the impact of the Democracy Canon, it is 
necessary to first highlight some important aspects about substantive canons 
and codified rules of construction. 
A.  Statutory Interpretation at the State Level 
For more than a century, scholars have debated the best way to interpret 
statutes at the federal level.21  Statutory interpretation in practice, however, 
is very different at the state level than at the federal level.22  This is due in 
 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89, 101–04 (2014) (noting the constitutional provisions in all fifty states that provide 
voting protection). 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof . . . .”); see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary:  The 
Crucial Role of State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to 
Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 354–57 (2008) (providing various ways in 
which state legislatures impact election administration). 
 17. Douglas, supra note 3, at 3. 
 18. Hasen, supra note 2, at 71. 
 19. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 20. See infra Appendix A. 
 21. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 478 (5th ed. 2014) (providing 
a brief timeline of statutory interpretation theories). 
 22. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1755 
(2010) (“[S]tate court developments may be changing the terms of the statutory interpretation 
debate in ways that may be far more productive than anything currently happening in the 
federal arena.”). 
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part to the codification by state legislatures of rules of statutory construction, 
a phenomenon that has not occurred to the same degree at the federal level.23 
1.  Codified Rules of Construction 
While canons of statutory interpretation exist only as a part of the common 
law at the federal level,24 all fifty states have enacted statutory canons, 
informing the courts on how their statutes should be interpreted.25  The 
codification of interpretative canons began in the nineteenth century with 
legislatures enacting provisions instructing courts to liberally construe 
certain statutes.26  Over time, state legislatures have enacted all types of 
interpretative canons, including textual canons, extrinsic source canons, and 
substantive canons.27  These codified rules of construction have raised 
constitutional concerns, namely, whether legislatures are infringing on the 
judicial sphere in telling courts how to interpret the law.28 
State legislatures enact these rules of construction to instruct courts on how 
to interpret their work product.  In practice, these codified canons might not 
be successful, as state courts have either ignored the rules or have navigated 
their way around them.29  For example, Abbe Gluck analyzes how the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has purposefully avoided the state’s codified 
plain meaning rule by simply finding ambiguity in the statutes before the 
court.30  Theoretically, such skirmishes could be understood as a type of 
interbranch dialogue,31 but the practical consequences may make this theory 
less persuasive.32  Further, the adoption of a particular theory of statutory 
 
 23. While the United States Congress has enacted some statutory directives, it has not 
attempted to codify a comprehensive set of interpretive canons. See, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, 
“Which Is to Be the Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature?:  When Statutory Directives 
Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 846–54 (2009) (providing various 
examples of statutory directives but noting that “Congress has not enacted a general theoretical 
directive”). 
 24. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2093 (2002) (describing federal courts’ canons as “pure common law”). 
 25. See generally Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 
98 GEO. L.J. 341 (2010) (providing an in-depth analysis of codified canons in every state). 
 26. See Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
211, 215–17 (1994) (outlining the history of codified rules of construction). 
 27. See Scott, supra note 25, at 352. 
 28. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1826–27 (Codified rules of construction “raise[] new 
questions about which branch—judicial or legislative—primarily controls methodological 
choice” of interpretation techniques.); see also Jellum, supra note 23, at 842 (arguing that 
codified rules of construction are unconstitutional “when enacted to apply generally to many 
statutes”); Rosenkranz, supra note 24, at 2102–03 (arguing in support of federal codified rules 
of construction). 
 29. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25 (providing examples of courts avoiding or 
ignoring legislated rules); see also Romero, supra note 26, at 241–42 (noting several practical 
limitations on how codified canons impact judicial decision-making). 
 30. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1795–96; see also infra Part II.A.1. 
 31. See James J. Brudney & Ethan J. Leib, Statutory Interpretation as “Interbranch 
Dialogue”?, 66 UCLA L. REV. 346, 390–98 (2019) (exploring the benefits of conceptualizing 
statutory interpretation as dialogue). 
 32. See id. at 378–79 (noting that judicial concerns over the constitutional implications of 
codified rules may limit the interbranch dialogue concept).  It is possible that these statutes 
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interpretation by individual judges can make the impact of codified canons 
more nuanced.33 
2.  Substantive Canons 
The codification of rules of construction is further complicated when one 
considers substantive canons.  Substantive canons are the judge-made 
presumptions used “to protect important background norms derived from the 
Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject 
areas.”34  Courts use these presumptions to favor “polic[ies] that courts have 
identified as worthy of special protection,” meaning that courts apply these 
presumptions in a nonneutral way with respect to those policies.35  These 
canons have generated plenty of debate.  Scholars and judges bemoan 
substantive canons as allowing courts to decide cases based on their personal 
policy preferences,36 with Justice Antonin Scalia famously referring to them 
as “dice-loading rules.”37  Not only do these substantive canons permit 
judges (unelected at the federal level) to consider policy issues but they act 
as a tool for the judiciary to displace the legislature’s policy preferences.38  
In this regard, substantive canons may raise constitutional concerns about the 
proper role of the judiciary.39  Additionally, some scholars see substantive 
 
still curb judicial discretion to a degree by forcing the judge to “approach their task with an 
appropriate comportment to the job [instead of] imagin[ing] that they are in conversation with 
no one but themselves.” Id. at 391.  A close analysis of developments in five states, however, 
finds that these rules do little to dissuade courts from relying on their own interpretative 
methods. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25. 
 33. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1826–27 (finding that “state judges who reject the 
legislated rules . . . are self-proclaimed textualists”). 
 34. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 
833 (2017). 
 35. JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 266 
(2010). 
 36. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 109, 119 (2010) (“It is difficult to isolate a single policy objective behind any substantive 
canon, for a canon’s purpose often lies in the eyes of the beholder.”); James J. Brudney & 
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 109 (2005) (Empirical data of the U.S. Supreme Court’s canon usage 
suggests that substantive canons “are functioning more as a façade to promote judicial policy 
preferences than as a principled methodological tool.”).  But see Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. 
L. REV. 647, 656 (1992) (arguing that judges only rely on canons when they do not have 
personal policy preferences). 
 37. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION 3, 28 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 38. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn?:  Should Congress Turn 
Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992) (arguing that substantive canons 
“clearly reflect judicial, not congressional, policy concerns”). 
 39. See Scalia, supra note 37, at 29 (noting that substantive canons raise “the question of 
where the courts get the authority to impose” such rules). 
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canons as resulting in unpredictable decisions, eroding the ideals of uniform 
law and predictable decision-making.40 
However, substantive canons are not entirely nefarious.  These canons can 
act as a shield, allowing courts to watch over certain rights or classes of 
individuals that have historically required more protection—the rule of lenity 
being a classic example.41  Unpredictable decision-making may not be such 
a bad result if it means that courts are protecting individual rights.  
Additionally, substantive canons allow courts to notify legislatures about the 
courts’ expectations for statutes by communicating to the legislatures how 
the courts will fill in statutory gaps.42 
Codifying substantive canons adds yet another complication to this 
inquiry.  One such codified canon is the rule of liberal construction.43  Thirty-
six states have adopted some form of the liberal construction rule, with 
seventeen of those states having provisions instructing courts to liberally 
construe all statutes.44  The rule to liberally construe statutes has been the 
topic of much debate and confusion45 and is often depicted as a tool for 
judges “to impose their own values on society.”46  Critics see the rule of 
liberal construction as providing for far too much judicial discretion at the 
expense of the integrity of the legislative process.47  Thus, any statute asking 
 
 40. See Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory 
Interpretation:  Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117 MICH. L. 
REV. 71, 123 (2018) (finding that the Roberts Court’s use of canons “raise[s] significant 
questions about whether canons improve interpretive predictability, constrain judicial 
discretion, or supply a stable interpretive background for Congress”); Scalia, supra note 37, 
at 28 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is added, 
on one or the other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.”). 
 41. Other examples include the principle that courts should construe statutes about 
veterans’ benefits liberally in favor of the veterans, see King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 
215, 220–21 (1991), and the presumption to construe “ambiguities in deportation statutes in 
favor of aliens.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 1214 & n.229 (discussing the inconsistent 
application of this presumption). 
 42. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162, 2284 (2002) (noting that canons can be used to “maximize the satisfaction of legislative 
preferences by procuring more explicit legislative action”).  Concerns about the effectiveness 
of interbranch dialogue may complicate Elhauge’s theory. See supra notes 31–32. 
 43. See Scott, supra note 25, at 399–401. 
 44. See id. at 402 tbl.11. 
 45. See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 9, 12–23 (2000) (undertaking an extensive review of the Canon); Antonin Scalia, 
Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 581 (1989–
90) (referring to the liberal construction rule as “the prime example of lego-babble”). 
 46. Mullins, supra note 45, at 37 (rejecting this characterization). 
 47. A common critique of the rule of liberal construction stems from the idea that 
legislation is the result of legislators compromising to find a middle ground that satisfies a 
majority on both sides of the aisle.  If they lead to a deviation from a given compromise, 
instructions to liberally construe a statute are in direct conflict with the importance of that 
compromise in creating legislation. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 95 (2009) (“[T]he liberal interpretation of remedial statutes may 
go well beyond the legislature’s compromise solution.”); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING 
STATUTES 53 (2014) (“[T]he courts can use [canons] in ways that fundamentally shape 
outcomes differently than how Congress intended . . . .”).  Another critique is that 
congressional awareness of such canons would paralyze the legislative process entirely. See 
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the courts to liberally construe a provision is approached with skepticism by 
some. 
The fact that citizens elect most state judges48 may mollify fears about 
substantive canons at the state level.  When a judge is elected, rather than 
appointed, some argue that she can (or should) have greater leeway in 
considering policy reasons when interpreting statutes.49  Using substantive 
canons may allow an elected judge to consider how her constituents would 
want her to decide the case while staying within the bounds of the rule of 
law.50  At the very least, elected judges’ reliance on substantive canons is 
limited by the will of their constituents, who can vote the judge out if a canon 
elicits undesirable results.51  Either way, critiques of substantive canons 
might hold less weight when citizens elect both the legislator and judge. 
B.  The Democracy Canon:  A Tool for Interpreting State Election Laws 
Richard Hasen was the first to identify and explore the Democracy Canon, 
beginning by taking a deep dive into its historical references.52  Hasen traces 
the Democracy Canon back to as early as 1885 when the Texas Supreme 
Court held that “[a]ll statutes tending to limit the citizen in his exercise of 
this right [to vote] should be liberally construed in his favor.”53  Such 
language has appeared throughout the following two centuries in state court 
decisions resulting in the enfranchisement of voters.54  Hasen urges that the 
“Democracy Canon forces legislators to make their intent more visible to 
all”55 and so courts should use it as a tool to enforce the underenforced 
constitutional norm of voting equality.56 
Yet Hasen is aware of the havoc the Democracy Canon may wreak.  He 
acknowledges that the Democracy Canon is susceptible to one of the major 
 
ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 26–27 (1997) (“[A] bill drafter’s awareness of this rule of interpretation 
would . . . guarantee the defeat of the bill if he or she were to take the position that no 
compromise is possible because the courts will ignore it.”).  But see Krishnakumar, supra note 
34, at 841 (finding some instances where “the [Roberts] Court seeks to use substantive canons 
to honor congressional intent”). 
 48. For an overview of the judicial selection systems in all fifty states, see Roy A. 
Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1084–86 (2007).  
For a review of the 2018 judicial elections, see State Supreme Court Elections, 2018, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_supreme_court_elections,_2018 [https:// 
perma.cc/N2DP-UV6Q] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 49. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory 
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1238 (2012) (exploring the idea of “interpretive 
divergence” in which elected judges have a greater degree of freedom in interpreting statutes). 
 50. Id. at 1246–48. 
 51. This argument is more nuanced than it appears at first blush since voters tend to pay 
less attention to judicial reelections than elections for other offices. See id. at 1231–35. 
 52. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 75–83. 
 53. Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett, 64 Tex. 500, 509 (1885); see also Hasen, supra note 2, 
at 71–72 (discussing Owens). 
 54. Hasen, supra note 2, at 75–81 (providing numerous examples of the Democracy 
Canon throughout history). 
 55. Id. at 103. 
 56. Id. at 97. 
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criticisms of substantive canons:  “it can play a role in the actual and 
perceived politicization of the judiciary.”57  Scholars have been quick to 
highlight other problems with the Democracy Canon.  Chad Flanders decries 
the Democracy Canon as favoring one legitimate democratic hallmark (the 
right to vote) over another (the legislative process).58  Justin Levitt raises 
concerns about the inconsistent application of the Democracy Canon since 
“the search for statutory ambiguity seems to depend largely on the will of the 
judge in question.”59  Christopher Elmendorf opines that the Democracy 
Canon’s detriments outweigh its benefits.60  One such detriment comes from 
placing the burden on the legislature to either state, ex ante, that a provision 
should be strictly construed or correct a court’s overly liberal interpretation 
of a statute.61  Such requirements, Elmendorf argues, waste lawmaker energy 
and displace other issues on the legislative agenda.62 
Hasen suggests ways to address some of these concerns.  He argues that 
the Democracy Canon will not be seen as delegitimizing the courts if the 
public is educated on the Canon’s consistent usage63 and if the state 
legislatures “act ex ante to prevent state court overreaching.”64  In other 
words, “a state legislature concerned about state court application of the 
Democracy Canon . . . can use clear statements to negate its application.”65  
Colorado, Hasen points out, provides an example of effective dialogue 
between the legislature and the courts:  the Colorado legislature enacted a 
Democracy Canon provision but clearly stated throughout its election code 
when a provision should be strictly construed.66 
Yet as previously discussed, it is unclear how effective the codification of 
interpretation canons is in restraining judicial discretion.67  Is Hasen’s 
suggestion of ex ante legislative action enough to ease concerns about the 
 
 57. Id. at 106; see also supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 58. See Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 
1373–74 (2012).  Flanders suggests that courts should not apply the Democracy Canon to 
election laws that are facially neutral when enacted (or are “behind a veil of ignorance”) 
because legislators cannot manipulate these statutes to favor a certain candidate or party. See 
id. at 1373. 
 59. Justin Levitt, Resolving Election Error:  The Dynamic Assessment of Materiality, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 155 (2012). 
 60. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
1051, 1054 (2010). 
 61. See id. at 1062–63. 
 62. See id. at 1066.  For Richard Hasen’s response to Elmendorf’s critiques, see generally 
Richard L. Hasen, The Benefits of the Democracy Canon and the Virtues of Simplicity:  A 
Reply to Professor Elmendorf, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1173 (2010). 
 63. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 112.  But see Elmendorf, supra note 60, at 1055. 
 64. Hasen, supra note 2, at 106. 
 65. Id. at 74; see also Eric H. Kearney et al., Perfect Is the Enemy of Fair:  An Analysis 
of Election Day Error in Ohio’s 2012 General Election Through a Discussion of the 
Materiality Principle, Compliance Standards, and the Democracy Canon, 62 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 279, 312–13 (2014) (arguing in favor of ex ante codification). 
 66. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 1180.  For further discussion on Colorado’s codified 
Democracy Canon provision, see infra Part II.B.1. 
 67. See supra notes 36–38. 
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Democracy Canon?  Or is Colorado an outlier?  This Note seeks to clarify 
this issue. 
C.  Methodology:  Organization of the States 
To assess the impact of the codified Democracy Canon on state courts, I 
began by reviewing the election codes and general rules of construction for 
all fifty states.  From this survey, I divided the fifty states into three 
categories:  (1) Democracy Canon codified; (2) rejection or disregard of the 
Democracy Canon; and (3) semi–Democracy Canon codified.68  The 
Democracy Canon codified category includes states with provisions advising 
that either (a) the entire election code should be construed broadly in favor 
of the right to vote or (b) particular sections within the election code should 
be liberally construed in favor of the right to vote.  This category includes 
fourteen states.69 
The second category, rejection or disregard of the Democracy Canon, 
includes states that either have no codified liberal construction rule or have 
codified rules of construction that advise courts against considering the 
purpose or spirit of the statute, both of which are inherently incompatible 
with the Democracy Canon.70  There are fourteen states in this category.71 
The third category, semi–Democracy Canons codified, includes states 
where the relevant statutes could either favor the Democracy Canon or 
another state interest would limit enfranchisement, like the state’s interest in 
preventing election fraud.  This category includes states that have (a) a 
general provision to construe statutes liberally that is not specifically about 
election provisions or (b) a provision stating that the election code’s purpose 
is to uphold both the right to vote and the integrity of the election process by 
preventing fraud.72  There are twenty-two states in this category.73  This Note 
analyzes how the codification of the Democracy Canon (or the lack thereof) 
affects decisions regarding election disputes at the highest courts of certain 
states. 
For the longitudinal review in Part II, I chose specific states to analyze in 
greater depth by considering three factors.  I selected states that (1) offer a 
range of geographically diverse locations; (2) are varied in terms of the 
categorization of codified Democracy Canons and have varied histories of 
codifying the Democracy Canon; and (3) have at least ten cases in which the 
 
 68. See infra Appendix A. 
 69. See infra Appendix A. 
 70. Such a claim of incompatibility is, of course, a generalization.  However, because 
liberal construction is often aligned with legislative purpose, see Mullins, supra note 45, at 
45–46, and the Democracy Canon specifically relies on the purpose of election laws, these 
provisions rejecting the spirit of the law should, in theory, make it more difficult for courts to 
invoke the Democracy Canon. 
 71. See infra Appendix A. 
 72. An example of a provision falling into this second group is Wyoming. See WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-2-101(b) (2020) (“This Election Code shall be construed so that all legally qualified 
electors may register and vote, that those who are not qualified shall not vote, and that fraud 
and corruption in elections shall be prevented.”). 
 73. See infra Appendix A. 
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state’s highest court explicitly accepted or rejected the Democracy Canon.74  
Based on these three factors, Part II analyzes the Democracy Canon decisions 
from Nevada (Democracy Canon codified), Colorado (semi–Democracy 
Canon codified), Connecticut (rejection or disregard of the Democracy 
Canon), and Arkansas (semi–Democracy Canon codified).  I have collected 
all the election decisions at the four states’ highest courts that in some way 
reference the Democracy Canon,75 with the earliest case decided in 1883.76 
I categorized these decisions further based on the type of election dispute, 
using the same three types of disenfranchisement as Hasen.  The first group 
is vote counting cases, in which enfranchisement is determined based on the 
court’s decision to either count or void the challenged ballots.77  The second 
group, voter eligibility or registration cases, involves disputes where citizens 
argue that they have been denied the right to vote prior to election day.78  
Lastly, candidate or party competitiveness cases are disputes in which a 
candidate claims to have been wrongly denied the ability to seek election.79  
The methodology for the dataset in Part III, which considers a broader range 
of more recent Democracy Canon decisions, is detailed in Part III.A. 
II.  LONGITUDINAL REVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON 
Initially, it appears that states have seen a decline in references to the 
Democracy Canon; searches for the case law yielded results mostly from 
before 1960.80  Originally, undertaking a longitudinal review was meant to 
provide support for this observation.  However, an analysis of the 
Connecticut, Arkansas, Nevada, and Colorado case law suggested the 
opposite:  some of these courts were invoking the Democracy Canon after 
1960 almost as often as they had before 1960.  Of the utmost importance, 
however, is that in these states, the courts in recent decades are much more 
likely to invoke the Democracy Canon and still decide the case in a way that 
disenfranchises voters.  Thus, even in states where the courts have 
consistently relied upon the Democracy Canon, the Canon’s appearance is 
more likely today to lead to disenfranchisement, a sort of decline in and of 
itself. 
 
 74. It should be noted that no court refers to the presumption to liberally construe election 
statutes as the “Democracy Canon.”  Richard Hasen coined this phrase to describe the 
presumption referred to by courts. 
 75. I used a variety of methods to locate these decisions, including West Key Number 53 
under the topic Election Law (142T).  I also searched each jurisdiction with various Boolean 
searches (for example, “‘liberally construe’ AND election OR vote” and “statute AND 
election OR vote”).  I found additional cases by using LexisNexis’s “Shepardizing” feature 
and Westlaw’s “Citing References” feature. 
 76. See Stinson v. Sweeney, 30 P. 997 (Nev. 1883). 
 77. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 83.  For an example of a case in this group, see infra notes 
190–95 and accompanying text (discussing Moran v. Carlstrom). 
 78. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 83. 
 79. See id. at 84.  For example, a court can disenfranchise a voter by not permitting a 
candidate from the voter’s political party to appear on the ballot. See, e.g., Butts v. Bysiewicz, 
5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010); see also infra notes 103–11. 
 80. This was clear in both my use of the relevant Key Number and in my Boolean 
searches. See supra note 75. 
1968 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Before turning to each state’s analysis, this dataset (collected in 
Appendices B–E) warrants a few caveats.  First, this analysis only looks at 
decisions that in some way invoke the Democracy Canon and so does not 
itself reflect whether the Democracy Canon is often or rarely invoked by 
courts in election disputes.  Similarly, this analysis does not suggest that these 
four states are more likely to disenfranchise voters today than they were in 
the first half of the twentieth century, as that is beyond the scope of this Note. 
A.  No Historically Codified Democracy Canon 
Part II.A explores how state courts have historically engaged with the 
Democracy Canon when the state legislature has either hinted that the court 
should not use the Canon (Connecticut) or remained silent on the issue 
(Arkansas). 
1.  Connecticut 
Though Connecticut has codified rules of construction, there is no liberal 
construction provision.81  Instead, section 1-2z of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut endorses the plain meaning rule.82  Limiting the courts to a plain 
meaning interpretation implies that the Connecticut legislature does not wish 
the courts to implement canons like the Democracy Canon if the statutory 
language is unambiguous.83 
Connecticut’s use of the Democracy Canon before 1960 is more varied 
than some of the other states in this analysis.84  Of the nine cases invoking 
the Canon before 1960, three led to the disenfranchisement of voters, five 
enfranchised voters, and one case was split.85  The first instance of the 
Democracy Canon comes in Chief Justice Charles Bartlett Andrews’s dissent 
in Talcott v. Philbrick.86  Citing a concern for fraudulent voting, the majority 
voided 286 votes cast on ballots issued by the Republican Party that 
contained the word “citizens” and thus purported to be issued by the citizens, 
 
 81. In addition, my research yielded no instances of a codified Democracy Canon in the 
historical Connecticut statutes available for review. 
 82. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-2z (2020) (“The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, 
be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.  If, after 
examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and 
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the 
meaning of the statute shall not be considered.”). 
 83. Section 1-2z was enacted in 2003, in reaction to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 
decision in State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562 (Conn. 2003) to no longer use the plain meaning 
rule. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1791–92 (analyzing this conflict between the Connecticut 
Supreme Court and legislature). 
 84. See infra Appendix B. 
 85. For Part II, I use “split” to refer to decisions in which the court both enfranchised and 
disenfranchised voters.  For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Walsh would 
not apply a liberal construction when the circumstances of the disputed ballots “preclude[d] 
the idea that they were the result of ignorance, accident, or mistake.” 25 A. 1, 5 (Conn. 1892); 
see also infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  Because the court assumed that there was 
intentional misconduct, the court only counted some, but not all, of the challenged ballots. See 
Walsh, 25 A. at 6. 
 86. 20 A. 436, 439 (Conn. 1890) (Andrews, C.J., dissenting). 
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not a specific party.87  The majority held that this violated the statute 
requiring “the ballots [to] contain only the names of the candidates, the office 
voted for, and the name of the political party issuing the same.”88  Chief 
Justice Andrews, the former governor of Connecticut,89 argued that the 
majority’s construction of the statute would actually encourage fraud because 
political parties could purposefully void certain votes by handing out ballots 
listing the incorrect party name.90  Given this absurd result, Andrews 
believed the court should count the votes since “no voter is to be 
disfranchised, and no ballot is to be declared void, on doubtful 
construction.”91  Andrews cited to other states’ decisions, including Kellogg 
v. Hickman92 from Colorado93 and Owens v. State ex rel. Jennett94 from 
Texas,95 to bolster his Democracy Canon argument.96  Yet, the court did not 
adopt Andrews’s view until two years later in State v. Walsh.97  Though the 
court rejected some votes (making the case a split decision), the court adopted 
a “presumption in favor of the voter.”98  This presumption led almost entirely 
to decisions resulting in voter enfranchisement for the next sixty years.99 
Though the Connecticut Supreme Court often relied on the Democracy 
Canon to enfranchise voters in the first half of the century, the court 
consistently used it to disenfranchise voters after 1960; of the eight cases 
decided after 1960 that invoked the Democracy Canon, seven 
disenfranchised voters and one was a split decision.100  These eight decisions 
include some election disputes in which the court refused to even entertain a 
 
 87. Id. at 437 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Gov. Charles Bartlett Andrews, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/ 
governor/charles-bartlett-andrews/ [https://perma.cc/6KWM-DYJS] (last visited Mar. 17, 
2020). 
 90. Talcott, 20 A. at 439–40 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 439. 
 92. 21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889). 
 93. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 94. 64 Tex. 500 (1885). 
 95. See supra note 53. 
 96. See Talcott, 20 A. at 439 (Andrews, C.J., dissenting). 
 97. 25 A. 1 (Conn. 1892). 
 98. Id. at 4. 
 99. See, e.g., Scully v. Town of Westport, 145 A.2d 742, 745 (Conn. 1958) (validating 
absentee ballots when noncompliance with statutes did not affect voters); Flanagan v. Hynes, 
54 A. 737, 738 (Conn. 1903) (counting ballots for a candidate that was not the official party 
candidate because of the presumption of liberal construction); Merrill v. Reed, 52 A. 409, 410 
(Conn. 1902) (Violations of the statute “were not sufficient to make the ballot void, under the 
principles of construction applicable to those provisions of our election laws which tend 
toward limiting the privileges of the elector.”); Coughlin v. McElroy, 43 A. 854, 856 (Conn. 
1899) (counting ballots with illegal marks on them because of a liberal construction); 
Fessenden v. Bossa, 37 A. 977, 979 (Conn. 1897) (“Where the legislature in express terms 
says that a ballot shall be void for some cause, the courts must undoubtedly hold it to be void; 
but no voter is to be disfranchised on a doubtful construction, and statutes tending to limit the 
exercise of the ballot should be liberally construed in his favor.”).  But see Denny v. Pratt, 135 
A. 40, 41 (Conn. 1926) (finding that the Democracy Canon “cannot prevail as against a 
statutory requirement expressed in unmistakable language”). 
 100. See infra Appendix B. 
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Democracy Canon argument, such as when interpreting absentee voting 
statutes.101  In other types of disputes, like candidate eligibility cases, the 
court acknowledged that the statute in question should be construed liberally 
in favor of candidate eligibility, but this presumption “does not authorize [the 
court] to ignore the clear intent of the legislature.”102  The court even refused 
to rely on the Democracy Canon to grant candidates access in situations 
where the result of ineligibility was severe, stripping a major political party 
of having any candidate in the election.  In Butts v. Bysiewicz,103 the 
Connecticut secretary of state refused to place an incumbent judge on the 
ballot because the secretary did not receive the judge’s certificate of 
endorsement from his political party before the statutory deadline.104  The 
record revealed that the candidate mailed the endorsement, as permitted by 
the statute, but the secretary never received it nor was it returned to the 
candidate.105  The candidate argued that he should appear on the ballot, 
giving the voters more candidates to choose from, and that the court should 
not honor a strict construction of the statutory deadline.106  The court refused 
to extend the deadline for the candidate’s unintentional noncompliance 
because “filing deadlines for ballot access ‘are designed to ensure the 
integrity of the election process in general.’”107  In a footnote, the court 
rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument because he failed to 
show that the court’s strict construction “involved the actual 
disfranchisement of voters.”108  The disenfranchisement of voters, the court 
noted, was not the result of the court’s statutory interpretation but of the 
candidate’s untimely inquiry into the status of his endorsement, which meant 
he missed the deadline to run as an independent or write-in candidate.109  The 
court acknowledged the harsh results of this interpretation—the Republican 
candidate would be running unopposed.110  Still, the court felt that it could 
not “intervene when the legislature clearly has expressed its intent to require 
 
 101. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1261 (Conn. 2018) (rejecting absentee 
ballots for noncompliance because the legislature “enacted a regulatory scheme designed to 
prevent fraud as far as practicable by mandating the way in which absentee ballots are to be 
handled”). But see In re Election of the U.S. Representative for the Second Cong. Dist., 653 
A.2d 79, 105–06 (Conn. 1994) (partially relying on the Democracy Canon to count some 
absentee ballots). 
 102. Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 730 (Conn. 2010) (interpreting “attorney at law of 
at least ten years” to mean that attorney general candidates must have ten years of litigation 
experience); see also id. at 802 (Bishop, J., concurring) (concurring because the majority 
“disregards the canon it claims to embrace, namely, that election statutes should be construed 
liberally in favor of eligibility” and instead “imports into the statute a restriction on eligibility 
that is neither implied nor expressed by the statute’s language”). 
 103. 5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010). 
 104. Id. at 947. 
 105. Id. at 935. 
 106. Id. at 936–37. 
 107. Id. at 939 (quoting Forcade-Osborne v. Madison Cty. Electoral Bd., 778 N.E.2d 768, 
772 (Ill. 2002)). 
 108. Id. at 937 n.5. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 947. 
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strict compliance with the filing deadline . . . .  Any relief must come from 
the legislature.”111 
Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Surgeon,112 the court interpreted a statute to 
reject a candidate’s petition to appear on the ballot.  In doing so, the court 
explicitly rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument, stating that, 
while the Democracy Canon has merit, it 
does not authorize the court to substitute its views for those of the 
legislature or to read into an election statute a limitation on its application 
that the legislature easily could have imposed but did not. . . .  Accordingly, 
the principle that election laws must be liberally construed does not affect 
[the court’s] conclusion.113 
The four most recent cases from the Connecticut Supreme Court invoking 
the Democracy Canon acknowledged the plain meaning provision, section 1-
2z,114 but circumvented the provision by finding the statute ambiguous.115  
In these cases, the Connecticut Supreme Court repeatedly found ways not to 
restrict its interpretation to the plain meaning.116  For example, in Bysiewicz 
v. Dinardo,117 the Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted a statute requiring 
a candidate for attorney general to be “an attorney at law of at least ten years’ 
active practice at the bar of this state.”118  The Court found that the statutory 
language was ambiguous119 but still refused to allow the plaintiff to run as a 
candidate:  “the presumption [in favor of eligibility] does not authorize us to 
ignore the clear intent of the legislature that the attorney general must have 
some measure of experience in trying cases.”120  Because the plaintiff had no 
litigation experience, his candidacy was rejected by the court, despite the 
court’s acknowledgment that the statute was ambiguous and the presumption 
in favor of greater eligibility would normally require the court to rule in the 
candidate’s favor.   
This, however, creates an irreconcilable tension:  the court finds the 
election provision ambiguous to avoid relying on section 1-2z.  Yet, when an 
election statute is ambiguous, the court’s Democracy Canon precedent urges 
the court to liberally construe the provisions in favor of enfranchisement.  
Then, despite the ambiguity in the statute, the Democracy Canon is rejected.  
 
 111. Id. 
 112. 937 A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007). 
 113. Id. at 22. 
 114. See Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1257 (Conn. 2018); Butts, 5 A.3d at 937; 
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 A.3d 726, 737 (Conn. 2010); Gonzalez, 937 A.2d at 20. 
 115. See, e.g., Keeley, 179 A.3d at 1262–63 (“To the extent that any ambiguity remains, 
we agree with the trial court that the legislative history . . . makes it abundantly clear that the 
legislature intended for partisan individuals . . . to be excluded from the process.”); Butts, 5 
A.3d at 946 (reviewing the statute’s legislative history to find ambiguity); Gonzalez, 937 A.2d 
at 20 (“We conclude that the statute’s reference to ‘any petition page circulated in violation 
of this provision’ is ambiguous.”). 
 116. This pattern is consistent with Abbe Gluck’s observations of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court’s reaction to section 1-2z. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1791–92. 
 117. 6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010). 
 118. Id. at 730. 
 119. Id. at 737–38. 
 120. Id. at 741. 
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It is strange for a court that generally embraces a purposivist outlook by 
rejecting a codified plain meaning rule to conclude that it cannot “substitute 
its views for those of the legislature,”121 despite the inherently purposivist 
goals of the Democracy Canon. 
Is there any way to reconcile these two positions?  The divergence may be 
explained by considering that the Connecticut Supreme Court is less apt than 
other courts to employ substantive canons, believing that they “should be 
employed as a last resort, after all other attempts to garner meaning have been 
exhausted.”122  In other words, if the court cannot derive the statute’s purpose 
from its plain meaning or legislative history, the court may be unwilling to 
solely rely on a substantive canon, like the Democracy Canon, to support 
such a broad reading of the statute. 
Another simple, yet disconcerting, explanation for this tension is that the 
justices’ individual policy concerns were better embodied by 
disenfranchisement in these cases.  The justices that decided Gonzalez, 
Dinardo, and Butts were all appointed by relatively conservative 
governors,123 and each of those decisions led to the disenfranchisement of 
Democratic candidates.124  However, when the court revisited the issue in 
2018 in Keeley v. Ayala,125 the justices, who by this time were mostly 
appointed by a Democratic governor,126 still decided to disenfranchise a 
Democratic candidate.  The court refused to count absentee ballots that were 
not returned in one of the methods authorized by the statute.127  Noting that 
“vot[ing] by absentee ballot is a special privilege,”128 the court harshly 
refused to count the votes out of a concern for fraud.129  Any belief that the 
almost entirely Democrat-appointed court would revitalize the Democracy 
Canon to protect enfranchisement may have been quashed with the Keeley 
decision. 
 
 121. Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. 2007); see also Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 
A.3d 932, 939 (Conn. 2010). 
 122. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 618 (Conn. 2003) (Zarella, J., dissenting); see also 
Gluck, supra note 22, at 1829 (finding that state judges who consider themselves textualists 
“demote the substantive canons favored by the federal textualists”). 
 123. These three cases were decided by ten justices:  Chase Rogers, Joette Katz, Christine 
Vertefeuille, Barry Schaller, William Sullivan, Richard Palmer, Ian McLachlan, Dennis 
Eveleigh, Flemming Norcott, Jr., and Peter Zarella.  Additionally, Judge Thomas Bishop of 
the Connecticut Appellate Court sat with the court to hear Dinardo.  Fairly conservative 
governors appointed all ten of these justices, as well as Judge Bishop. 
 124. See Butts, 5 A.3d at 935 (The candidate judge was running as a Democrat.); Dinardo, 
6 A.3d at 729 (The plaintiff sought Democratic candidacy for secretary of state.); Gonzalez, 
937 A.2d at 16 (The candidate petitioned to appear on the ballot as a Democrat.). 
 125. 179 A.3d 1249 (Conn. 2018). 
 126. Seven justices decided Keeley:  Richard Palmer, Andrew McDonald, Richard 
Robinson, Gregory D’Auria, Raheem Mullins, Maria Araujo Kahns, and Christine 
Vertefeuille.  A Democratic governor appointed the five newest justices:  McDonald, 
Robinson, D’Auria, Mullins, and Kahns. 
 127. Keeley, 179 A.3d at 1261, 1265. 
 128. Id. at. 1258. 
 129. Id. at 1258–59. 
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2.  Arkansas 
The Arkansas legislature has never enacted a codified Democracy Canon 
and there is no codified Democracy Canon today.  Though there is a general 
liberal construction provision,130 the Arkansas Supreme Court has not cited 
to this provision in adjudicating any election disputes.  The court has invoked 
the Democracy Canon ten times since 1925 and only three of these cases 
were decided after 1960.131  In the early twentieth century, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court repeatedly construed certain election statutes liberally but 
only enfranchised voters when discussing either election contests132 or 
candidate access disputes.133  For example, in Fisher v. Taylor,134 the 
appellant, hoping to run for the Arkansas General Assembly but serving in 
the navy, gave his mother power of attorney to complete the requirements to 
get his name on the ballot.135  This included signing a loyalty pledge and 
sending it to the county central committee.136  However, the committee’s 
chairman rejected the application, claiming that it did not comply with party 
rules since the loyalty pledge was not personally signed by the candidate.137  
The trial court denied the candidate a writ of mandamus to compel the 
printing of his name on the ballot.138  The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed 
because “[t]he right to become a candidate for public office is, under our form 
of government, a fundamental right which should not be in any manner 
curtailed without good cause.”139  The court seemed to reach this decision, 
however, in large part because of the candidate’s naval service:  “soldiers and 
sailors absent from home in defense of their country have been the objects of 
special consideration at the hands of lawmakers and courts.”140 
 
 130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-2-202 (2020) (“All general provisions, terms, phrases, and 
expressions used in any statute shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent and 
meaning of the General Assembly may be fully carried out.”). 
 131. See infra Appendix C.  With only ten decisions, Arkansas has the fewest cases 
invoking the Democracy Canon of the four states in Part II.  Despite having fewer cases, I 
chose to include Arkansas so that a state from the Southeast was included, and Arkansas had 
the most applicable decisions from the Southern states.  Additionally, the Arkansas cases 
include election contest disputes, not one of the three categories of disenfranchisement I have 
outlined. 
 132. See, e.g., Gunter v. Fletcher, 233 S.W.2d 242, 243 (Ark. 1950) (relying on the liberal 
construction of election statutes as akin to a pleading standard); La Fargue v. Waggoner, 75 
S.W.2d 235, 239 (Ark. 1934) (“[T]he statute providing for contesting elections should be 
liberally construed, the purpose of the contest being to determine what candidate received the 
greatest number of votes.”); Robinson v. Knowlton, 40 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Ark. 1931) 
(requiring a new election because “the statute providing for contesting elections should be 
liberally construed”).  But see Logan v. Russell, 206 S.W. 131, 132 (Ark. 1918) (prohibiting 
an election contest because the statute’s language was clear). 
 133. See, e.g., Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217, 217 (Ark. 1946). 
 134. 196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946). 
 135. Id. at 217–18. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 217. 
 139. Id. at 220. 
 140. Id. 
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After 1960, there are only three cases from the Arkansas Supreme Court 
that invoke the Democracy Canon; two of these decisions resulted in 
enfranchisement, while one resulted in disenfranchisement.141  In Republican 
Party of Garland County v. Johnson,142 the Arkansas Supreme Court 
narrowly interpreted a statutory deadline to file the candidate’s party 
certificate, prohibiting the candidate from appearing on the ballot, even 
though the candidate missed the deadline by only a few minutes.143  The court 
explicitly rejected the candidate’s Democracy Canon argument, stating that 
Fisher “was specifically limited to its facts.”144  Yet, just one month later, 
the court in Populist Party of Arkansas v. Chesterfield145 liberally interpreted 
a statute dictating procedures about petitions for candidate access.  This 
broad interpretation permitted Ralph Nader to appear on the 2004 
presidential ballot.146  The court, citing to Fisher, stated that “[a]ny law or 
party rule, by which this inherent right of the citizen [to become a candidate 
for public office] is diminished or impaired ought always to receive a liberal 
construction in favor of the citizen desiring to exercise the right.”147 
Is there any way to reconcile this inconsistent application?  Perhaps the 
court is less willing to enfranchise voters via the Democracy Canon when the 
violation of the election statute is based on the candidate’s wrongdoing.  The 
court may expect candidates to have a better understanding of the law or 
judges may have less sympathy for candidates.  However, this explanation 
fails to take into account that the election violation in Fisher was the result 
of a candidate’s error.  The more likely reason for this inconsistent 
application is that the court will employ the Democracy Canon whenever it 
feels that a candidate deserves to appear on the ballot, though this inference 
is hard to confirm given the small sample of cases available.  The justices 
sympathized with the candidate in Fisher because he was a member of the 
navy during World War II148 and felt Nader deserved to be on the ballot 
because he had collected the required number of signatures.149  The court did 
not have the same sympathy for the candidate in Republican Party of 
Garland County because she failed to meet the deadline for no reason other 
than tardiness (despite the candidate testifying that she waited until the last 
minute out of fear that she would lose her job since she would be running 
against her employer).150  Whether or not the Arkansas Supreme Court’s 
inconsistent application of the Democracy Canon is the result of judicial 
cherry-picking will only become clearer as the court hears more candidate 
access disputes. 
 
 141. See infra Appendix C. 
 142. 193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2004). 
 143. Id. at 250. 
 144. Id. at 252 n.2. 
 145. 195 S.W.3d 354 (Ark. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 355. 
 147. Id. at 359 (citing Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946)). 
 148. See Fisher v. Taylor, 196 S.W.2d 217, 219–20 (Ark. 1946). 
 149. See Populist Party of Ark., 195 S.W.3d at 360 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 150. Republican Party of Garland Cty. v. Johnson, 193 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Ark. 2004). 
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B.  Historically Codified Democracy Canon 
The Connecticut and Arkansas analyses show that the Democracy Canon 
is more prone to inconsistent results today than it was prior to 1960.  The 
next inquiry is whether the codification of the Democracy Canon by the state 
legislatures impacts this trend. 
1.  Nevada 
Nevada’s legislature enacted the Democracy Canon as early as 1925.151  
Today, Nevada’s codified Democracy Canon is found in section 293.127 of 
the Nevada Revised Statutes.152  The Nevada Supreme Court relies on the 
codified Democracy Canon provision more than any other state in the 
Democracy Canon codified category.153  Further, all of the decisions citing 
to section 293.127 actually result in the enfranchisement of voters, another 
anomaly in this analysis.154  In one case, the Democracy Canon is the only 
tool of statutory interpretation relied on to interpret the statute in question.155 
Even though the Democracy Canon has consistently been codified in 
Nevada, the Nevada Supreme Court’s reliance on the Democracy Canon to 
enfranchise voters has still decreased.  The court has mentioned the 
Democracy Canon twenty-three times since 1883.156  Though the Democracy 
Canon has been mentioned relatively consistently,157 it has been rejected 
more frequently since the turn of the twenty-first century, which has led to 
more decisions to disenfranchise voters.158 
 
 151. See 1925 Nev. Stat. 19 (“This statute shall be liberally construed to the end that 
minority groups and parties shall have an opportunity to participate in the elections and that 
the real will of the electors shall not be defeated . . . .”). 
 152. NEV. REV. STAT. § 293.127(1) (2020) (“This title must be liberally construed to the 
end that:  (a) All electors, including, without limitation, electors who are elderly or disabled, 
have an opportunity to participate in elections and to cast their votes privately; (b) An eligible 
voter with a physical or mental disability is not denied the right to vote solely because of the 
physical or mental disability; and (c) The real will of the electors is not defeated by any 
informality or by failure substantially to comply with the provisions of this title with respect 
to the giving of any notice or the conducting of an election or certifying the results thereof.”). 
 153. See infra Appendix D.  The Nevada Supreme Court has cited to the codified 
Democracy Canon provision five times between 1975 and 2009. See generally Lueck v. 
Teuton, 219 P.3d 895 (Nev. 2009); Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 
100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004); Eller Media Co. v. City of Reno, 59 P.3d 437 (Nev. 2002); Long 
v. Swackhamer, 538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975); LaPorta v. Broadbent, 530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975).  
Two of these cases, Lueck and Eller Media Co., have not been included in this analysis because 
they do not fall within the three categories of disenfranchisement.  The other six cases since 
1960 in Appendix D are instances where the court refers to the common-law Canon, without 
reference to the codified provision. 
 154. See infra Appendix H; see also infra Part III.A.2. 
 155. See Long, 538 P.2d at 589 (finding that the Independent American Party should appear 
on the ballot because a “qualified political party that has met standards for qualification should 
be afforded an opportunity to express its views at election time through its candidates”). 
 156. See infra Appendix D. 
 157. The Canon was invoked twelve times between 1880 and 1960 and eleven times 
between 1960 and 2019. See infra Appendix D. 
 158. While only two of the twelve decisions before 1960 disenfranchised voters, five of the 
eleven decisions after 1960 disenfranchised voters. See infra Appendix D. 
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These decisions indicate that the court was much more open to the idea of 
the Democracy Canon before 1960.  For instance, in Buckner v. Lynip,159 the 
court validated ballots that had distinguishing marks written on them, despite 
a statute that read “[a]ny ballot upon which appears names, words or marks 
written or printed . . . shall not be counted.”160  The court opined that 
invalidating the ballot for “[s]uch a word or mark would not be within the 
spirit of the law, although within its letter” and so applied a liberal 
construction to count the ballots.161  The court did not hesitate to rely on the 
Democracy Canon despite such clear statutory language. 
More recently, the court, though still willing to invoke the Democracy 
Canon, tends to do so more as a tiebreaker between two possible 
interpretations, as was the case in Cirac v. Lander County.162  In that case, 
the court interpreted the statute in question163 to permit a wife with a 
community property interest to be considered a “taxpayer” and thus able to 
validly sign an initiative petition.164  The court reached this conclusion 
because “the right to vote should not be taken away due to a doubtful 
statutory construction.”165  Justice Gordon Thompson, in dissent, argued that 
“[t]his court is not empowered to annul or alter the legislative direction” of 
the statute because the “legislative intent is clearly expressed and there is no 
occasion for [statutory] construction.”166  Distressed by the majority’s 
disregard for what he considered to be the plain text of the statute, Justice 
Thompson concluded with a reminder that wives who own community 
property could have listed their names, along with their husbands’ names, on 
the assessment roll; for this reason, the wives’ “ineligibility must be 
attributed to them rather than to the statutory wording selected by the 
legislature.”167  Despite Justice Thompson’s concerns, the majority relied on 
the Democracy Canon to decide between two equally plausible 
interpretations of the statute:  the plain meaning or an interpretation within 
the “spirit and meaning” of the statute.168 
In the most recent invocation of the Democracy Canon, a unanimous 
Nevada Supreme Court refused to rely on the Canon.169  In interpreting the 
 
 159. 41 P. 762 (Nev. 1895). 
 160. Id. at 764. 
 161. Id. at 766.  But see id. at 767 (Belknap, J., dissenting) (“I admit that if my views are 
to be adopted the voters of the precinct at that election will be disfranchised, but I am 
confronted with what I think are clear and imperative provisions of law, incapable of judicial 
construction.”). 
 162. 602 P.2d 1012 (Nev. 1979). 
 163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 243.465 (2020) (“Whenever the residents of any county in this 
State shall file a petition with the clerk of the board of county commissioners, signed by 
qualified electors of the county, who are also taxpayers of the county as appears by the last 
real or personal property assessment roll . . . the board of county commissioners shall fix a 
time for a public hearing upon the petition . . . .”). 
 164. See Cirac, 602 P.2d at 1015. 
 165. Id. at 1016–17. 
 166. Id. at 1019 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 1020. 
 168. Id. at 1016 (majority opinion). 
 169. See Strickland v. Waymire, 235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010). 
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language of the Nevada Constitution permitting recall petitions, the court had 
to determine whether all registered voters could sign a petition to recall or 
just those who had voted in the election of the officer facing the potential 
recall.170  Respondents, seeking the former result, argued that the Democracy 
Canon required the court to count all the signatures and uphold the registered 
voters’ right to petition for a recall.171  The court disagreed, finding that the 
respondents “conflate[d] the right to submit a petition calling for recall with 
the right to vote at the special election that follows, which are two different 
things.”172  Although the court had considered invoking the Democracy 
Canon in the nineteenth century with regard to recall petitions,173 the court 
in Strickland v. Waymire174 affirmatively limited the Democracy Canon’s 
relevance in recall disputes. 
2.  Colorado 
Like Nevada, Colorado has a long history of codifying the Democracy 
Canon.175  Today, Colorado’s relevant statute is section 1-1-103(1) of the 
Colorado Revised Statutes.176  Though Hasen cites this provision as an 
example of the codified Democracy Canon,177 I argue that that section 1-1-
103(1) is only a semi–Democracy Canon provision because the same section 
permits courts to disenfranchise voters by including the language regarding 
fraud prevention.178  In other words, it is left to the court’s discretion as to 
which purpose (fraud prevention or voter accessibility) to prioritize in its 
interpretation.  The Colorado Supreme Court case law supports this 
conclusion:  the court, despite citing to section 1-1-103(1), still 
disenfranchises voters.179 
In analyzing the Colorado cases invoking the Democracy Canon, there are 
more references to the Canon after 1960 than before 1960.180  Yet, the 
Canon’s effectiveness has still been in decline:  the number of decisions 
 
 170. Id. at 613. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See generally State v. Scott, 285 P. 511 (Nev. 1930). 
 174. 235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010). 
 175. The legislature enacted a Democracy Canon provision as early as 1905. See 1905 
Colo. Sess. Laws 190 (“This act shall be liberally construed, so that all legally qualified 
electors may be registered, and that those who are not legal electors may be kept from such 
registration lists, and that fraud and corruption in elections may be prevented . . . .”). 
 176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2020) (“This code shall be liberally construed so that 
all eligible electors may be permitted to vote and those who are not eligible electors may be 
kept from voting in order to prevent fraud and corruption in elections.”). 
 177. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 79 n.49. 
 178. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1). 
 179. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Williams, 418 P.3d 478, 486 (Colo. 2018) (refusing to liberally 
construe the statute because section 1-1-103(1) does not apply to the statute in question); 
Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176, 1182–83 (Colo. 1989) (undertaking an extensive statutory 
analysis in voiding four write-in ballots). 
 180. The Colorado Supreme Court has invoked the Democracy Canon twenty-four times 
since 1889.  The Canon was invoked ten times before 1960 and fourteen times after 1960. See 
infra Appendix E. 
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disenfranchising voters has increased since 1960.  While all but one of the 
cases before 1960 relying on the Democracy Canon resulted in 
enfranchisement, over 40 percent of the decisions after 1960 (six of the 
fourteen cases) resulted in disenfranchisement.  Of the six cases after 1990, 
four resulted in disenfranchisement.181 
As was the case in Nevada, the Colorado Supreme Court was much more 
willing to rely on the Democracy Canon to overcome the plain meaning of 
statutes at the turn of the twentieth century.  In the court’s first invocation of 
the Canon in Kellogg v. Hickman,182 the court validated ballots that had been 
printed on paper not in compliance with the statute.  The court counted the 
ballots because “the spirit and intention of the law [was] not violated, 
although a literal construction would vitiate it.”183  The dissent rejected this 
interpretation, arguing that “[a] ballot proscribed as illegal before it is voted, 
is not, when voted, converted into a legal ballot.”184  Other cases from the 
court at this time followed the approach of the majority.185 
Since 1960, however, the Colorado Supreme Court has been less 
consistent in its application of the Democracy Canon.186  The court relied on 
the Canon in Meyer v. Lamm187 to validate some write-in ballots but void 
others.188  The court found that a liberal construction of the write-in statute 
is acceptable so that ballots are not rejected when “the intent of the voter to 
vote for a particular write-in candidate is clear.”189  In Moran v. 
Carlstrom,190 the court cited to the Democracy Canon provision, section 1-
1-103(1), to support the claim that “a ballot cast by a qualified elector should 
be rejected only if the elector’s intent cannot be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty.”191  When intent cannot be discerned, “the elector’s right to have 
the ballot count must give way to the right of the electorate to a fair and 
accurate count.”192  Here, four votes were not counted because the voters 
placed an “x” next to Moran’s name as well as an “x” next to another 
candidate’s name, which had been written in by the voters.193  The court 
 
 181. See infra Appendix E. 
 182. 21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889). 
 183. Id. at 327. 
 184. Id. at 331 (Helm, C.J., dissenting). 
 185. See, e.g., Littlejohn v. People ex rel. Desch, 121 P. 159, 162 (Colo. 1912) (invalidating 
legislation that “extend[s] to the denial of the franchise itself”); People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 
94 P. 294, 298–99 (Colo. 1908) (expanding eligibility of voters by relying on the codified 
Democracy Canon provision); Dickinson v. Freed, 55 P. 812, 814 (Colo. 1898) (“[C]ourts will 
not undertake to disfranchise any voter, by rejecting his ballot, where his choice can be 
gathered from the ballot . . . .”); Allen v. Glynn, 29 P. 670, 674 (Colo. 1892) (Helm, J., 
dissenting) (Election laws are “peculiarly entitled to such judicial construction as will 
effectuate its purpose, unless sound legal principles imperatively forbid.”). 
 186. Of the fourteen cases decided after 1960, seven led to enfranchisement, six led to 
disenfranchisement, and one decision was split. See infra Appendix E. 
 187. 846 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1993) (en banc). 
 188. Id. at 877–78. 
 189. Id. at 876. 
 190. 775 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1989). 
 191. Id. at 1180. 
 192. Id. at 1183. 
 193. Id. at 1178. 
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found it impossible to determine the voters’ intent and so rejected all four 
ballots.194  However, as Justice William H. Erickson noted in dissent, the 
intent of the four votes in question was easily ascertained given that the other 
candidate was ineligible for the position in question.195  Thus, the court 
avoided relying on the Democracy Canon simply by determining that the 
voters’ intent was unclear, despite there being room for reasonable minds to 
disagree about the voters’ intent. 
In the one other case citing to section 1-1-103(1), Kuhn v. Williams,196 the 
court again avoided liberally interpreting the statute.  The court found that a 
petition circulator was statutorily ineligible to collect signatures on behalf of 
the candidate, so all the signatures he collected could not be counted.197  The 
court acknowledged the harsh results: 
[The court’s decision] causes the [candidate’s] number of signatures to fall 
short of the 1000 required to be on the Republican primary ballot.  
Therefore, the Secretary may not certify [the candidate] to the 2018 primary 
ballot for [the election].  We recognize the gravity of this conclusion, but 
Colorado law does not permit us to conclude otherwise.198 
The secretary of state argued that the court was required to liberally construe 
the statute that permits judicial review.199  The court rejected this argument, 
stating that the liberal construction requirement “is independent from the 
issue of whether a protester may challenge the validity of a petition.”200  In 
addition, the court noted, a liberal construction of this statute would lead to 
an absurd result that the Colorado General Assembly could not have 
intended.201 
Despite having a codified Democracy Canon, the Colorado Supreme Court 
has still managed to disenfranchise voters by refusing to apply a liberal 
construction to the election statutes.  This may be the result of enacting a 
Democracy Canon provision that asks the courts to both protect the right to 
vote and prevent fraud.202  However, the court seems less concerned with 
fraud (though it is mentioned as a legitimate state interest) and more 
concerned with staying within the confines of the statutes’ plain language.203 
 
 194. Id. at 1183 (rejecting the ballots “because in each case the voter’s intent cannot be 
ascertained with reasonable certainty”). 
 195. Id. at 1183–84 (Erickson, J., dissenting). 
 196. 418 P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018). 
 197. Id. at 480–81. 
 198. Id. at 489. 
 199. Id. at 485. 
 200. Id. at 486. 
 201. Id. (“[P]ermit[ting] every facially valid petition to proceed, regardless of any 
underlying flaws” is an absurd result.). 
 202. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-1-103(1) (2020). 
 203. See, e.g., Kuhn, 418 P.3d at 489 (“Colorado law does not permit us to conclude 
otherwise.”); Moran v. Carlstrom, 775 P.2d 1176, 1183 (Colo. 1989) (“A commonsense 
reading of the statute shows these four ballots are defective within the meaning of [the disputed 
statute].”). 
1980 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
C.  Understanding the Longitudinal Analysis 
Given this Note’s analysis of these four states, one can make several 
assumptions about the Democracy Canon’s use over time.  First, even when 
these courts have consistently applied the Democracy Canon over time, its 
use is more likely to be associated with voter disenfranchisement after 1960 
than before.  Second, it appears that having a codified Democracy Canon 
either currently (Nevada) or historically (Colorado) does not impact this 
trend.  However, these states do have both more references to the Democracy 
Canon204 and more cases resulting in enfranchisement205 than Connecticut 
and Arkansas.  Thus, it is possible that the codification of the Democracy 
Canon had some impact on greater enfranchisement, though other factors 
could have played a role in this development. 
There are several hypotheses that may account for this shift toward 
disenfranchisement, none of which are mutually exclusive nor account for 
this trend entirely.  First, this decline may be the result of growing distrust in 
substantive canons more generally.206  Second, this shift may derive from a 
change in the composition of the electorate itself after 1960; with the passage 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,207 voting was made more accessible to 
nonwhite voters.208  Perhaps some courts were less willing to invoke the 
Democracy Canon if it meant enfranchising African-American voters.  A less 
accusatory conclusion may be that more election disputes were resolved by 
interpreting more recent federal statutes (or the state’s analogue statute), so 
justices were less inclined to rely on old precedent interpreting state laws that 
invoked the Democracy Canon.  Such an explanation might account for the 
courts’ (especially Connecticut’s) hesitation to rely on century-old 
precedent.209  Lastly, this shift may be a practical result as the number of 
election disputes in state courts skyrocketed toward the end of the twentieth 
century,210 encouraging courts to seek more precise justifications for their 
decisions.  With more eyes on election disputes now, courts may be less 
willing to rely on the Democracy Canon out of concern for jeopardizing the 
judiciary’s legitimacy.  To further understand why the Democracy Canon has 
become less effective, Part III of this Note explores the reasons underlying 
courts’ rejection of the Democracy Canon. 
 
 204. The total Democracy Canon references for each state were:  Connecticut (17); 
Arkansas (11); Nevada (23); and Colorado (24). 
 205. The total cases resulting in enfranchisement for each state were:  Connecticut (5); 
Arkansas (6); Nevada (16); and Colorado (16). 
 206. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 207. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 and 52 U.S.C.). 
 208. For an example of how the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has impacted voter 
enfranchisement in one state, see Paul Finkelman, The Necessity of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 and the Difficulty of Overcoming Almost a Century of Voting Discrimination, 76 LA. L. 
REV. 181, 220–22 (2015). 
 209. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 210. See supra note 2. 
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III.  LATITUDINAL REVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY CANON 
Part III analyzes decisions from the courts of last resort in all fifty states 
that have invoked the Democracy Canon since 2000.211 
A.  Preliminary Results from the Dataset 
1.  Assembling the Dataset 
For Part III, I collected one hundred cases decided since 2000 from thirty-
eight states.212  I then categorized these cases in several ways.  First, I 
determined the type of election dispute involved in the case.  Here, I was 
more expansive than in Part II213 and included disputes about election 
contests themselves and the constitutionality of initiative and recall 
petitions.214  The expanded categories of disputes reflect the wider variety of 
cases in which judges have decided the Democracy Canon is relevant. 
Second, I categorized the cases into three different results:  (1) voter 
enfranchised; (2) voter disenfranchised; and (3) other.215  Decisions falling 
within the “other” category do not clearly result in either the enfranchisement 
or disenfranchisement of voters.  This includes what I have been referring to 
as “split” decisions,216 as well as cases in which the court’s decision could 
be seen as enfranchising one general group of voters at the expense of 
disenfranchising another group.  An example of this is when a candidate has 
already been elected but the court orders a new election.217  In these cases, 
the court must decide whether to disenfranchise those who already voted or 
those who were unable to vote due to the error raised by the plaintiffs.  
 
 211. I selected the year 2000 because the presidential election debacle of 2000 
fundamentally changed how parties litigate election disputes.  See Richard L. Hasen, The 
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001–2010:  A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or 
Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 325, 325–26 (2011) (noting the “explosion” of 
election law litigation after Bush v. Gore).  On a practical note, limiting the dataset to cases 
decided after 2000 provided a manageable, yet informative, set of cases. 
 212. These cases were collected by searching Westlaw and LexisNexis using the same 
Boolean searches and Key Number in note 75 and limiting the results to decisions after 
January 1, 2000.  Thirteen states had no high court decisions citing to the Democracy Canon 
in this time frame. See infra Appendix F. 
 213. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
 214. Cases about the constitutionality of initiative and recall petitions involve a more 
specific Democracy Canon:  courts should liberally construe constitutional provisions in favor 
of the people’s right to petition their government. See, e.g., Ross v. Bennett, 265 P.3d 356, 
358 (Ariz. 2011) (“[T]his Court has interpreted constitutional and statutory provisions 
governing recall liberally to protect the public’s right to recall its officials.”).  However, 
because this is a subset of the Democracy Canon and often involves counting or not counting 
petition signatures, I have included them in this analysis. 
 215. See infra Appendix F. 
 216. See supra note 85. 
 217. See, e.g., In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, 
40 A.3d 684, 722 (N.J. 2012) (Rabner, C.J., dissenting) (“To annul the election is to 
disenfranchise 19,907 voters and raise questions about whether their constitutional right to 
vote has been denied.”). 
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Another example is when an election has been erroneously conducted and 
may have resulted in voter confusion or misconduct at the polls.218 
There are some caveats about this dataset.  To begin, this may not be a full 
survey of all instances in which the Democracy Canon has been invoked 
since 2000 in the highest court of every state, though I included every 
decision I found that falls within the relevant categories of 
disenfranchisement.219  Additionally, because this set of cases is limited to 
election disputes that explicitly mention a liberal construction in favor of 
enfranchisement, this analysis does not purport to reflect a greater trend in 
state election dispute results.  Instead, the data is meant only to highlight how 
courts are now employing the Democracy Canon.  Lastly, this dataset does 
not show that the Democracy Canon is less useful in protecting the right to 
vote than it has been historically (as was the analysis in Part II).  Building on 
the observations made in Part II, this Part provides a universe of cases that is 
helpful in considering why courts in the twenty-first century are 
disenfranchising voters despite referencing the Democracy Canon, which is 
meant to protect enfranchisement. 
2.  Initial Results 
Of the one hundred cases in this dataset, forty-nine of the cases resulted in 
the enfranchisement of voters, forty-one resulted in disenfranchisement, and 
ten resulted in other results.220  In broad strokes, reference to the Democracy 
Canon is almost as likely to result in voter disenfranchisement as it is to 
enfranchise voters.  This suggests that the Democracy Canon is not a 
powerful instrument for protecting the right to vote, and it is a mistake to 
assume that courts will enfranchise voters if the judges mention the Canon. 
Another intriguing result is that the enfranchisement/disenfranchisement 
split is just as pronounced in states where the Democracy Canon has been 
codified by the state legislature:  the twenty-six decisions in this category 
were equally split between enfranchisement and disenfranchisement (twelve 
each), with the remaining two cases falling into the other category.221  This 
category had the highest rate of disenfranchisement (46 percent) of all three 
categories.222  In addition, most of the decisions in this category do not have 
any citations to their codified Democracy Canon provision.223  However, the 
state court decisions that do cite to these provisions often enfranchise 
 
 218. E.g., Wesley v. Wash. Cty. Democratic Exec. Comm., 235 So. 3d 1379, 1386–87 
(Miss. 2017) (refusing to order a new election when the security of ballot boxes allegedly 
called all votes into question). 
 219. This dataset only includes cases in which some variation of the terms “liberal,” 
“strict,” “construe,” or “construction” appear in the opinion; if courts refer to the Democracy 
Canon using other language, it will not appear in this dataset. 
 220. See infra Appendix G. 
 221. See infra Appendix G. 
 222. See infra Appendix G. 
 223. Though there are twenty-six cases from this category of states that were decided after 
2000, there are only seven cases that cite to the codified Democracy Canon provision after 
2000. Compare infra Appendix G, with infra Appendix H. 
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voters.224  Though the presented dataset cannot provide a reason for this 
trend, one hypothesis is that state courts are hesitant to confine themselves to 
codified rules of construction.225  It could also be that these states generally 
have more codified canons of statutory interpretation, so justices have greater 
leeway in choosing which canons to rely on.  Regardless, the analysis of these 
decisions suggests that the mere existence of a codified Democracy Canon 
provision does not generally impact a court’s decision.  But when a court 
relies on the codified Democracy Canon provision by explicitly citing to it, 
the chances of enfranchisement increase dramatically. 
B.  Trends from the Dataset 
Because the invocation of the Democracy Canon, generally, is almost as 
likely to be associated with disenfranchisement as it is with enfranchisement, 
it is important to understand what might explain these results.  If a court 
purports to construe statutes in favor of the right to vote, how does it still 
disenfranchise voters?  To answer this question, this Part examines decisions 
in the dataset that either disenfranchise voters despite reference to the 
Democracy Canon or enfranchise voters with a dissenting opinion that 
critiques the court’s use of the Democracy Canon.226  These discussions 
provide a fruitful ground for understanding how the Democracy Canon is 
subject to judicial discretion and what other interpretive canons might sway 
a court to disenfranchise voters.  Understanding state courts’ reactions to the 
Democracy Canon can shine light on how attorneys and state legislatures 
should approach using the Canon. 
1.  The Rise of Textualism 
Some courts arguing against the legitimacy of the Democracy Canon do 
so by adopting a method of statutory interpretation akin to Gluck’s “modified 
textualism.”227  In short, Gluck identifies a new trend in state courts that 
differs from traditional textualism in that it offers a tiered approach to 
interpretation that “emphasizes textual analysis (step one); limits the use of 
legislative history (only in step two, and only if textual analysis alone does 
not suffice); and dramatically reduces reliance on the oft-used policy 
presumptions, the ‘substantive canons’ of interpretation (only in step three, 
and only if all else fails).”228 
Indeed, most of the cases rejecting the Democracy Canon do so because 
the plain language of the statute is clear and thus no further interpretation is 
 
 224. Of the seven cases that cite to a codified Democracy Canon provision after 2000, six 
of them led to enfranchisement. See infra Appendix H. 
 225. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25. 
 226. There are forty-eight cases that fall within this subset. See infra Appendix F. 
 227. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1834–42 (noting the differences between modified 
textualism and traditional textualism). 
 228. Id. at 1758. 
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necessary.229  Often, this involves determining whether the statutory 
language is mandatory or directory.  Typical in this regard is the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2004 decision In re Canvass of Absentee 
Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 General Election.230  The court had to decide whether 
absentee ballots delivered by third parties on behalf of nondisabled voters are 
valid votes that should be counted.231  The relevant statute, section 3146.6 of 
the Pennsylvania Election Code, states that “the elector shall send [the 
absentee ballot] by mail, postage prepaid, except where franked, or deliver it 
in person to said county board of election.”232  The appellate court counted 
the seventy-four absentee ballots because the voters had submitted their 
ballots via third parties in reliance on instructions from the board of elections, 
even though “those instructions violated the plain language of the Election 
Code.”233  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and voided 
the ballots after finding that “shall” in the statute “carries an imperative or 
mandatory meaning.”234  Appellees referenced the court’s precedent, urging 
that the election code be liberally construed, so that “shall” should be 
understood as directory rather than mandatory.235  The court rejected this 
argument, noting that the cases relied on by appellees were decided before 
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 
“which dictates that legislative intent is to be considered only when a statute 
is ambiguous.”236  Though acknowledging that “some contexts may leave the 
precise meaning of the word ‘shall’ in doubt,” the court nevertheless found 
the term “shall” to be unambiguous and refused to liberally construe the 
statute.237  By finding the plain language to be unambiguous, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court disenfranchised voters who simply relied on 
instructions from election officials. 
 
 229. See, e.g., State ex rel. Schmidt v. City of Wichita, 367 P.3d 282, 293–94 (Kan. 2016) 
(rejecting the Democracy Canon because the statute was not ambiguous); Becker v. Dean, 854 
So. 2d 864, 873 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J., dissenting) (noting that “promoting candidacy is 
unquestionably a laudable goal” but “[u]nderlying policy cannot supercede the clear language 
of the law”); Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 362–63 (Md. 2008) 
(same); Abrams v. Lamone, 919 A.2d 1223, 1243 (Md. 2007) (finding the Democracy Canon 
inappropriate because the court has “construed eligibility requirements strictly, where the 
language of the constitutional provision is clear”); Pony Lake Sch. Dist. 30 v. State Comm. 
for the Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 710 N.W.2d 609, 621 (Neb. 2006) (“[R]ule[s] of 
construction cannot authorize this court to expand the right of referendum beyond what has 
been reserved or to ignore its plain limitations.”); Ohio Renal Ass’n v. Kidney Dialysis Patient 
Prot. Amendment Comm., 111 N.E.3d 1139, 1145 (Ohio 2018) (The rule that an unambiguous 
statute is to be applied, not interpreted, “applies with particular force in this election case.”); 
Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 P.3d 1050, 1068 (Wyo. 2004) (rejecting the Democracy Canon because 
“construction, liberal or otherwise, of unambiguous provisions is not only unnecessary, but is 
unwarranted”). 
 230. 843 A.2d 1223 (Pa. 2004). 
 231. Id. at 1225. 
 232. Id. at 1226. 
 233. Id. at 1229. 
 234. Id. at 1231. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1231–32. 
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Even if a court finds ambiguity in the statute’s language, justices 
employing a method of interpretation similar to Gluck’s modified textualism 
hierarchy will only rely on substantive canons, like the Democracy Canon, 
as a last resort.238  Courts rejecting a liberal construction of the election 
statute in question do just this, relying on everything from dictionaries239 to 
legislative history240 to avoid employing the Democracy Canon.  The rising 
popularity of modified textualism in state courts may explain in part the 
hesitancy to rely on the Democracy Canon to enfranchise voters.  
Additionally, Part II of this Note showed that the supreme courts of 
Connecticut, Nevada, and Colorado are less willing now to rely on the 
Democracy Canon to overcome the plain language of a statute than before 
1960.241  A court, regardless of statutory interpretation method, can easily 
avoid employing the Democracy Canon if the court finds the language to be 
unambiguous. 
2.  Balancing Other State Interests 
Courts have acknowledged a number of state interests that may outweigh 
the interest of protecting enfranchisement.  For instance, in recall petition 
disputes, courts have found that the state’s interest in having rare recalls (to 
ensure stability and save costs) can outweigh the citizen’s right to recall.242  
Another idea courts emphasize is the interest in maintaining a uniform 
election code.243 
The most important state interest that courts are willing to uphold is the 
prevention of fraud.244  Hasen acknowledges that courts may not rely on the 
 
 238. See Gluck, supra note 22, at 1824–25. 
 239. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1262 (Conn. 2018) (defining “designate”); 
Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 932, 941 (Conn. 2010) (defining “invalid”); Becker v. Dean, 854 
So. 2d 864, 874 (La. 2003) (Weimer, J., dissenting) (defining “actually”); Kucera v. Bradbury, 
97 P.3d 1191, 1201 (Or. 2004) (defining “certify”); In re Contest of 2003 Gen. Election for 
the Office of Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 230, 238 (Pa. 2004) (defining “oath”). 
 240. See, e.g., Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179, 194 
(Nev. 2004) (A review of the legislative history removes ambiguity of the term “occupied” in 
the election statute.); Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488, 493 (N.Y. 2005) (Read, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the statute’s legislative history does not support the majority’s 
Democracy Canon argument). 
 241. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1–2. 
 242. See Strickland v. Waymire, 235 P.3d 605, 612 (Nev. 2010); Citizens for Honest & 
Responsible Gov’t v. Heller, 11 P.3d 121, 127 (Nev. 2000). 
 243. See Republican Party of Garland Cty. v. Johnson, 193 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Ark. 2004) 
(“[S]trict observance of statutory requirements is essential . . . as it is desirable that election 
results have a degree of stability and finality.”); Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 659 N.W.2d 724, 
730 (Minn. 2003) (“[I]t is this paramount importance of the right to vote that imbues the state 
with a compelling interest in preserving the orderliness and integrity of the election process.”); 
Kucera v. Bradbury, 97 P.3d 1191, 1202 (Or. 2004) (deferring to the secretary’s duty “to 
obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of the election 
laws”). 
 244. See, e.g., Peroutka v. Cronin, 179 P.3d 1050, 1057 (Haw. 2008) (rejecting the 
candidate’s petition signatures “[i]n light of the state’s interest in detecting fraudulent or 
questionable signatures”); Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 363 (Md. 
2008) (rejecting a liberal construction of statute to avoid effectively eliminating additional 
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Democracy Canon when there are serious allegations of fraud.245  However, 
courts have refused to employ the Democracy Canon even where there is a 
complete absence of fraud or intentional misconduct.246  For instance, the 
New York Court of Appeals voided all absentee ballots that were incorrectly 
submitted due to an election official’s error, not the wrongdoing of the 
voters.247  In responding to the dissent’s invocation of the Democracy Canon, 
the court held that the Democracy Canon could not be invoked even when 
voters were innocent of wrongdoing because “an exception predicated on 
voter innocence would swallow the rule, effectively relieving election 
officials of their obligation to adhere to the law.”248  Strict compliance with 
the election statutes, even if noncompliance was not the fault of the voter, is 
necessary because “a too-liberal construction . . . has the potential for 
inviting mischief on the part of candidates, or their supporters or aides, or 
worse still, manipulations of the entire election process.”249 
Even when fraud prevention is a valid concern in an election dispute, 
courts differ in understanding what their role is in upholding the state’s 
interest of fraud prevention in relation to the Democracy Canon.  Some courts 
will invoke the Democracy Canon so long as it does not trample on the state’s 
interest in preventing fraudulent elections.250  Under this view, the court has 
some discretion as to whether strict compliance with an election statute 
would compromise concerns about fraudulent voting.251 
Other courts conceptualize the enforcement of fraud prevention 
regulations as being quintessential to the right to vote, making the 
Democracy Canon unnecessary.  For example, in cases regarding the 
constitutionality of voter identification requirements, courts accepting the 
identification laws see the requirement as a method of fraud prevention that 
 
preventions against fraud); In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 
843 A.2d 1223, 1232–33 (Pa. 2004) (“To ignore [the statute’s] clear instructions regarding in-
person delivery would undermine the statute’s very purpose as a safeguard against fraud.”).  
But see Panio, 824 N.E.2d at 490 (relying on the Democracy Canon because the risk of fraud 
is less present in affidavit voting as opposed to absentee voting). 
 245. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 84. 
 246. See, e.g., Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 1249, 1261 (Conn. 2018) (“[T]he return of ballots 
in a manner not substantially in compliance with [statute] will result in their invalidation, 
regardless of whether there is any proof of fraud.”); Gross v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
819 N.E.2d 197, 202 (N.Y. 2004). 
 247. See Gross, 819 N.E.2d at 202. 
 248. Id. at 203. 
 249. Id. at 201 (quoting Stabler v. Fidler, 482 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (N.Y. 1985)). 
 250. See, e.g., Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 So. 2d 206, 221 (La. 2000) (A court will liberally 
construe a statute “to the extent that such tolerance of the irregularities will not lead to a 
manipulation of an election or affect the integrity of an election or the sanctity of the ballot.”); 
In re Contest of 2003 Gen. Election for the Office of Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 230, 237 (Pa. 
2004) (“[T]he policy of the liberal reading of the Election Code cannot be distorted to 
emasculate those requirements necessary to assure the probity of the process.” (quoting In re 
Cianfrani, 359 A.2d 383, 384 (Pa. 1976))). 
 251. See, e.g., Panio v. Sunderland, 824 N.E.2d 488, 491 (N.Y. 2005) (finding that the risk 
of fraud was less important when election error was the result of ministerial error). 
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does not unreasonably interfere with the right to vote.252  By preventing 
fraudulent voting, these laws “preserve the purity of elections” by 
“preventing lawful voters from having their votes diluted by those cast by 
fraudulent voters.”253  Whether or not a court takes such a strong stance on 
fraud prevention, it is clear that some courts simply believe that fraud 
prevention should be prioritized over broader enfranchisement. 
3.  Judicial Deference to Legislative Prerogatives 
Courts have suggested that employment of the Democracy Canon 
exemplifies a lack of judicial restraint.254  Many courts acknowledge that the 
outcomes of cases disenfranchising voters are unsavory but that such 
decisions fall outside the judicial scope of power.255  The courts reach this 
conclusion by acknowledging that election statutes are the compromised 
result of balancing the promotion of enfranchisement with “ensur[ing] the 
integrity of the election process.”256  Thus, courts will avoid a liberal 
construction of an election statute out of concern that such an interpretation 
would upset the legislature’s policymaking decision.257 
To not upset the legislature’s policymaking, courts must make certain 
assumptions about the legislature’s intent.  One of these assumptions is that 
the legislature intends to avoid absurd results when drafting legislation.258  
 
 252. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 851 
N.W.2d 302, 306 (Wis. 2014) (“[P]hoto identification is a reasonable regulation that could 
improve and modernize election procedures, safeguard voter confidence in the outcome of 
elections and deter voter fraud.”). 
 253. In re Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 
N.W.2d 444, 448 (Mich. 2007); see also League of Women Voters of Wis., 851 N.W.2d at 315 
(Voter identification law “promote[s] the right to vote by assuring that a constitutionally 
qualified elector’s vote counts with full force and is not offset by illegal ballots.”). 
 254. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 A.2d 13, 22 (Conn. 2007) (finding that the 
Democracy Canon “does not authorize the court to substitute its views for those of the 
legislature”); Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Iowa 2007) (“Our 
legislature has established certain basic voting requirements that we are obligated to enforce 
in the absence of a successful constitutional challenge to the statute.”). 
 255. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ritchie, 762 N.W.2d 218, 230 (Minn. 2009) (refusing to count 
absentee ballots even though “a more flexible process might be advisable as a matter of policy 
[but] that is for the legislature to decide”); State ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982, 
990 (Ohio 2008) (The Democracy Canon “does not allow [the court] to simply ignore facts 
and make unreasonable assumptions.”); Shambach v. Bickhart, 845 A.2d 793, 808 (Pa. 2004) 
(Castille, J., dissenting) (dissenting because the court “do[es] not possess a free-ranging power 
to strike down legislation that [it] finds contrary to amorphous ‘principles of democracy’”). 
 256. Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 932, 939 (Conn. 2010); see also Shambach, 845 A.2d at 
813 (Castille, J., dissenting) (A court’s “task is to strike the proper balance between protecting 
the elective franchise and enforcing the salutary directives of the Code” unless the statute’s 
language is clear.). 
 257. See, e.g., Comm. to Recall Robert Mendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 
7 A.3d 720, 749–50 (N.J. 2010) (“We cannot resolve the policy debate over recall” in part 
because that “can only be achieved through the amendment process.”); see also League of 
Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 651 (Minn. 2012) (Courts should not 
“second-guess the wisdom of policy decisions that the constitution commits to one of the 
political branches.”). 
 258. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 673–74 (defining the canon of avoiding absurd 
results). 
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Courts often refuse to employ the Democracy Canon if such a construction 
will lead to an absurd result.259  For example, the Missouri Supreme Court 
avoided a liberal construction of the residency requirement for a judicial 
candidate in Lewis v. Gibbons.260  The statute in question required the 
candidate to reside in the county where he or she was seeking election for “at 
least one year prior to the date of his [or her] election.”261  Gibbons, the 
challenged candidate, argued for a liberal construction of the statute so that 
his residency in the county for a year after college, but not the immediately 
preceding year, would be sufficient to meet the residency requirement.262  
The majority believed that such an interpretation was an absurd result since 
it “would permit a person to live in a county between the age of birth and 18 
months, to leave the county and to return 50 or 60 years later and be eligible 
to run.”263  Judge Michael Wolff, in dissent, did not necessarily disagree with 
the absurd result of this interpretation but nevertheless felt Gibbons was 
eligible:  “Incumbent-protection laws, such as the one at issue here, often are 
inherently absurd.  If the reading that I advocate seems absurd, it may be 
precisely what this statute deserves.”264 
Another canon that courts invoking the Democracy Canon will 
simultaneously refer to is the constitutional avoidance canon.265  The two 
substantive canons are clearly related:  if the state’s constitution guarantees 
the right to vote, then interpreting a statute to avoid an unconstitutional 
reading would avoid an interpretation that would infringe on the right to 
vote.266  However, there are some who believe that these two canons do not 
work in tandem.  At least one judge concerned about infringing on the 
legislature’s role has understood the constitutional avoidance canon to be just 
as problematic as the Democracy Canon.  Justice Ronald Castille’s dissent in 
 
 259. See, e.g., Doe v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 363 n.28 (Md. 
2008) (Interpreting “shall” as “anything other than mandatory” would lead to absurd results.); 
Abrams v. Lamone, 919 A.2d 1223, 1248 (Md. 2007) (The broad interpretation of eligibility 
requirements is “absurd or unworkable.”); City of North Platte v. Tilgner, 803 N.W.2d 469, 
481 (Neb. 2011) (determining that a liberal construction leads to an absurd result because it 
would shield all taxation measures from referendum); In re Canvass of Absentee Ballots of 
Nov. 4, 2003 Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa. 2004) (“To construe [the statute] as 
merely directory would render its limitation meaningless and, ultimately, absurd.”).  But see 
Populist Party of Ark. v. Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Ark. 2004) (holding that not 
construing the statute liberally would lead to an absurd result); Weinschenk v. State, 203 
S.W.3d 201, 225 (Mo. 2006) (Limbaugh, J., dissenting) (same). 
 260. 80 S.W.3d 461 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 261. Id. at 463–64. 
 262. Id. at 464. 
 263. Id. at 466. 
 264. Id. at 471 (Wolff, J., dissenting). 
 265. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 21, at 725–29 (discussing the constitutional 
avoidance canon). 
 266. See, e.g., Populist Party of Ark. v. Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354, 359 (Ark. 2004) 
(rejecting the lower court’s interpretation that denied the candidate access because such 
interpretation “infringes upon one of the fundamental civil liberties of our democracy, that of 
the secret ballot”); Comm. to Recall Robert Mendez from the Office of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 
7 A.3d 720, 760 (N.J. 2010) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting) (“[T]he principle commanding that 
we avoid a constitutional question . . . authoritatively counsels that we . . . stay our hand and 
allow the recall process to go forward.”). 
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Shambach v. Bickhart,267 rejecting the majority’s use of the Democracy 
Canon, invoked constitutional avoidance as an example of “salutary 
principles requiring judicial restraint.”268  Even if employing the Democracy 
Canon would mean avoiding unconstitutional interpretations, some courts 
may still not be willing to rely on the Canon because such a practice falls 
outside the scope of the judicial function and infringes on the legislature’s 
role. 
IV.  THE LIMITATIONS AND BENEFITS OF CODIFYING THE DEMOCRACY 
CANON AND OTHER SUBSTANTIVE CANONS 
The datasets in Parts II and III highlight three trends in state court 
references to the Democracy Canon.  First, in at least four states, invocation 
of the Democracy Canon is less likely to be associated with the 
enfranchisement of citizens today than it was in the first half of the twentieth 
century.269  Second, codification of the Democracy Canon does not stop this 
trend toward disenfranchisement, though it may mitigate the trend’s 
effects.270  Lastly, courts invoking the Democracy Canon in the twenty-first 
century have been almost as likely to disenfranchise voters as they are to 
enfranchise them.271  All three trends seem to point to one conclusion:  in 
practice, the Democracy Canon is no longer effective. 
This analysis reinforces some of the fears about the Democracy Canon that 
scholars have raised.272  Its use is scattered and leads to unpredictable results, 
with enfranchisement and disenfranchisement being almost equally as likely 
when a state court references the Democracy Canon.273  Further, the reasons 
courts give for rejecting the Democracy Canon mirror scholarly concerns 
about the Canon.  The courts cite to concerns about encroaching on the 
legislature’s power either by veering from a statute’s plain meaning274 or 
undertaking policymaking decisions,275 both of which derive from concerns 
about disrupting the legislative process.276  Other courts take the opposite 
 
 267. 845 A.2d 793 (Pa. 2004). 
 268. Id. at 808 (Castille, J., dissenting). 
 269. See supra Part II. 
 270. See supra Part II.B.  Though the overall trend in Nevada and Colorado was toward 
disenfranchisement, there were still more cases resulting in enfranchisement than in 
Connecticut and Arkansas. See supra notes 204–05.  Perhaps the presence of a codified 
Democracy Canon provision at least made it harder for courts to justify disenfranchising 
voters. 
 271. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 272. See supra notes 57–62. 
 273. This supports concerns raised by Levitt, as well as more general concerns about the 
inconsistent results of substantive canons. See Levitt, supra note 59, at 155; see also supra 
note 40. 
 274. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 275. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 276. See Elmendorf, supra note 60, at 1064–65 (“If [conservative legislators] knew that 
there was a special ‘pro voter’ canon of interpretation that could be trotted out by liberal judges 
to construe the inevitable imperfections of legislative drafting in a manner that undermines the 
legislative deal, they would fight tooth and nail against bills that even modestly liberalize the 
terms of voter participation . . . .”); Flanders, supra note 58, at 1373 (“When election statutes 
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approach, embracing the chance to make the choice between voting integrity 
and voter access,277 a policy choice that theoretically should make critics of 
substantive canons shiver.  Thus, it seems as if these courts reject the 
Democracy Canon out of either fear of or total disregard for the concerns 
regarding substantive canons. 
Richard Hasen believes that these dangers “should [not be met] with a 
jettisoning of the Democracy Canon.”278  Despite the unpredictable results 
the Democracy Canon yields, I agree with Professor Hasen.  Yet there must 
be a way to make the Democracy Canon more effective, to ensure that 
judicial interpretation of statutes does not infringe on the right to vote.  
Codification of the Democracy Canon is still the best way to ensure that 
statutory interpretation of election laws does not lead to disenfranchisement 
of voters.  To be sure, codification is not foolproof.  This dataset supports 
Abbe Gluck’s insight that state high courts will work around or simply ignore 
codified rules of construction.279  Of the fourteen states with a codified 
Democracy Canon, only half cited to the Democracy Canon provision.280  In 
addition, most citations to the codified Democracy Canon provisions are 
from before 2000.281  However, of the twenty-three cases that did cite to the 
Democracy Canon provision, only four led to disenfranchisement (a rate of 
about 17 percent).282  Though the results of the Democracy Canon are still 
unpredictable, the uncertainty decreases when the court invokes the 
Democracy Canon provision, as opposed to the Democracy Canon at 
common law. 
Even if this limited information on states with codified Democracy Canons 
is not sufficiently convincing, on a theoretical level, codification of the 
Democracy Canon should assuage the fears outlined by courts in justifying 
their rejection of the Democracy Canon.  For courts that fear infringing on 
the legislature’s power, codification of the Democracy Canon makes these 
concerns moot.  Some see the Democracy Canon (and substantive canons 
more generally) as undermining the legislative process itself.283  Codification 
of the Democracy Canon, however, legislatively legitimizes it.  When a 
legislature enacts a provision urging the judiciary to employ a value-driven 
rule (e.g., “access to voting deserves protection”), it is affirmatively 
prioritizing the value of the rule over the risk of inconsistent application.284  
 
have been drafted in a nonpartisan way, the court should respect the outcome of the democratic 
legislative process.”). 
 277. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 278. Hasen, supra note 2, at 106. 
 279. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.1. 
 280. See infra Appendix H.  The states that did not cite at all to their Democracy Canon 
provisions were California, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, and Vermont. 
 281. See infra Appendix H (Of the twenty-three cases citing to the Democracy Canon 
provisions, sixteen were decided before 2000.). 
 282. See infra Appendix H.  The states that cited to their Democracy Canon provisions 
were Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wisconsin. 
 283. See Flanders, supra note 58, at 1373; see also supra note 47. 
 284. See Scott, supra note 25, at 405 (“[I]t is hard to say that interpreters can ignore 
[codified canons] where that permission has been democratically granted.”). 
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In other words, how can Democracy Canon discretion infringe on the 
legislative power when the legislature instructs the courts to use such 
discretion?  Legislatures can further bolster the codified Democracy Canon 
by enacting a general Democracy Canon provision but noting that certain 
provisions of the election code are exceptions to the general Democracy 
Canon provision and should be strictly construed.285  This practice would 
assure the judiciary that, based on the whole election code, the legislature has 
been explicit about which provisions it intended to be strictly enforced and 
which provisions are open to a liberal construction.286 
For courts that rejected the Democracy Canon to prioritize other state 
interests (like fraud prevention), codification of the Canon can inform the 
courts which interests the legislature considers the most important.  With a 
codified Democracy Canon provision, courts will find it harder to justify 
other interests over those explicitly mentioned by the legislature.  This is 
especially effective if a legislature enacts a statute explicitly stating that 
voting accessibility is a more important state interest than the prevention of 
fraud.287  This solution is clearly not perfect:  not only would it be difficult 
to enact such a provision but judges would still be capable of working around 
this plain language.288  However, providing such explicit instructions would 
make it more difficult for courts to hide behind the veil of fraud prevention. 
The solution of codification is not limited to the Democracy Canon.  At 
the state level, there has been an expansive codification of statutory rules of 
construction.  This provides a unique opportunity to reconsider critiques of 
substantive canons that are less viable once state legislatures codify the 
canons.  If courts and scholars are willing to give weight to their criticisms 
of substantive canons, those criticisms must withstand the codification of the 
substantive canons by a legislature.289  Enactment of a substantive canon 
eliminates concerns about judicial interpretations undermining the legislative 
process290 because enactment of the codified substantive canon is now itself 
the result of compromise-based legislation.  Unpredictability in the results of 
substantive canons291 also is less of a concern after codification, as the 
legislature has expressed its belief that the need for judicial discretion is 
worth the risks of uncertainty in application when certain issues are involved 
 
 285. Richard Hasen makes this suggestion as well. See Hasen, supra note 2, at 122 (“A 
legislature worried about judicial overreaching could pass election statutes that not only 
clearly state their mandatory and non-waivable nature, but also indicate that such statutes 
should be strictly construed against expansive voter rights.”). 
 286. An example of this would be Colorado’s election code, which Hasen relies on to 
rebuke some of Elmendorf’s claims. See Hasen, supra note 62, at 1180. 
 287. An example of this statute is Nevada’s section 293.127. See supra note 151.  All of 
the Nevada Supreme Court’s cases citing to this provision resulted in the enfranchisement of 
the voters.  However, this statute is not entirely effective, as the Nevada Supreme Court still 
decided four other cases since 2000 that did not cite to this provision and resulted in 
disenfranchisement. 
 288. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 289. There is still a question of whether legislatures even have the authority to enact rules 
of construction. See supra note 28.  However, this issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 290. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 40. 
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(like voting rights).  Finally, when state legislatures codify substantive 
canons, statutory interpretation can be better understood as interbranch 
dialogue, which can lead to a cooperative and more accurate understanding 
of what the law is.292  State courts (as well as scholars) should be open to 
reconsidering substantive canons when they are codified by the state 
legislature as a rule of construction.  By reconceptualizing the codified rules 
of construction as interbranch dialogue, both branches can work in tandem 
to ensure that voters, not judges, determine the outcomes of our elections. 
CONCLUSION 
The Democracy Canon could be (and has been) a powerful tool for courts 
to safeguard our right to vote.  However, as this Note has shown, the impact 
of this Canon, particularly over the past half-century, has been inadequate, if 
not outright detrimental.  If state courts are unwilling to use the Canon, then 
the task of protecting the right to vote must fall on the legislatures’ shoulders.  
Codification of the Democracy Canon, and other substantive canons, 
undermines the courts’ concerns about invoking a common-law substantive 
canon.  Once a substantive canon is codified, courts and scholars will have 
to reconsider their well-established critiques of substantive canons. 
Yet this exercise is not just about recharacterizing scholarly debate.  While 
the data on the Democracy Canon may seem inconsequential within the 
bigger picture of election law, it demonstrates how state courts may operate 
to either enhance or limit individual rights, like the right to vote.  More 
importantly, shedding light on how courts can circumvent substantive canons 
like the Democracy Canon can help litigants and lawmakers alike frame their 
arguments to confront these challenges when fighting for our right to vote.  
   
 
 292. See Brudney & Leib, supra note 31, at 390 (Interbranch dialogue “supports 
institutions’ appropriate humility, leverages their comparative institutional competence, and 
harnesses the benefits of deliberative engagement on matters of law and policy.”). 
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APPENDIX A 
 Categorization of Democracy Canon Statutes 
 
 
 
 
   
Category 1:  Democracy 
Canon Codified 
Category 2:  Rejection or 
Disregard of Democracy 
Canon 
Category 3:  Semi–
Democracy Canon 
Codified 
Applicable 
to All 
Election 
Provisions 
Applicable to 
Specific 
Election 
Provisions 
No Rule to 
Liberally 
Construe Statute 
Other 
Incompatible 
Rules of 
Construction 
General 
Rule to 
Liberally 
Construe 
Statutes 
States That 
Appear in 
Both 
Categories 1 
and 2 
Nebraska 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Wisconsin 
California 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Massachusetts 
New Jersey 
New York 
South Carolina 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Vermont 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Indiana 
Maine 
Michigan 
Mississippi 
New Hampshire 
North Carolina 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
Connecticut 
Louisiana 
New Mexico 
Rhode Island 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Missouri 
Montana 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Washington 
 
Colorado 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
North Dakota 
Pennsylvania 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Wyoming 
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APPENDIX B 
Connecticut Democracy Canon Cases 
 
Case Type of Dispute Result 
Reference to 
Democracy Canon 
Talcott v. Philbrick,  
20 A. 436 (Conn. 1890) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Fields v. Osborne,  
21 A. 1070 (Conn. 1891) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
State ex rel. Phelan v. Walsh,  
25 A. 1 (Conn. 1892) 
Vote counting Split Majority (followed) 
Fessenden v. Bossa,  
37 A. 977 (Conn. 1897) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Coughlin v. McElroy,  
43 A. 854 (Conn. 1899) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Merrill v. Reed,  
52 A. 409 (Conn. 1902) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Flanagan v. Hynes,  
54 A. 737 (Conn. 1903) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Denny v. Pratt, 
135 A. 40 (Conn. 1926) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Scully v. Town of Westport,  
145 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1958) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Hurlbut v. Lemelin,  
230 A.2d 36 (Conn. 1967) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Dombkowski v. Messier,  
319 A.2d 373 (Conn. 1972) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Wrinn v. Dunleavy,  
440 A.2d 261 (Conn. 1982) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
In re Election of U.S. 
Representative for Second Cong. 
Dist., 653 A.2d 79 (Conn. 1994) 
Vote counting Split 
Majority (followed and 
rejected); concurrence 
(followed) 
Gonzalez v. Surgeon,  
937 A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo,  
6 A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Butts v. Bysiewicz,  
5 A.3d 932 (Conn. 2010) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Keeley v. Ayala,  
179 A.3d 1249 (Conn. 2018) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
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APPENDIX C 
Arkansas Democracy Canon Cases 
 
Case Type of Dispute Result 
Reference to 
Democracy Canon 
Logan v. Russell, 
206 S.W. 131 (Ark. 1918) 
Election contest Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Cain v. Carl-Lee, 
269 S.W. 57 (Ark. 1925) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Robinson v. Knowlton, 
40 S.W.2d 450 (Ark. 1931) 
Election contest Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
La Fargue v. Waggoner, 
75 S.W.2d 235 (Ark. 1934) 
Election contest Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Phillips v. Rothrock,  
110 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1937) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Horne v. Fish, 
127 S.W.2d 623 (Ark. 1939) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Fisher v. Taylor, 
196 S.W.2d 217 (Ark. 1946) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Gunter v. Fletcher, 
233 S.W.2d 242 (Ark. 1950) 
Election contest Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Reed v. Baker, 
495 S.W.2d 849 (Ark. 1973) 
Election contest Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Republican Party of Garland 
Cty. v. Johnson,  
193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 2004) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Populist Party of Ark. v. 
Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 354 
(Ark. 2004) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
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APPENDIX D 
Nevada Democracy Canon Cases 
 
Case Type of Dispute Result 
Reference to 
Democracy Canon 
Stinson v. Sweeney, 
30 P. 997 (Nev. 1883) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
State ex rel. Galusha v. Davis, 
19 P. 894 (Nev. 1888) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Buckner v. Lynip, 
41 P. 762 (Nev. 1895) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
Dennis v. Caughlin, 
41 P. 768 (Nev. 1895) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
State ex rel. McMillan v. Sadler, 
58 P. 284 (Nev. 1899) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
State ex rel. Kaufman v. Martin, 
106 P. 318 (Nev. 1910) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
In re Primary Ballots, 
126 P. 643 (Nev. 1910) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Nicholson v. Commins, 
111 P. 289 (Nev. 1910) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Turner v. Fogg, 
159 P. 56 (Nev. 1916) 
Registration Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
State ex rel. Morton v. Howard, 
248 P. 44 (Nev. 1926) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
State ex rel. Matzdorf v. Scott, 
285 P. 511 (Nev. 1930) 
Recall petition Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Gilbert v. Breithaupt, 
104 P.2d 183 (Nev. 1940) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Lundberg v. Koontz, 
418 P.2d 808 (Nev. 1966) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Long v. Swackhamer, 
538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
LaPorta v. Broadbent, 
530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
Cleland v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court, 552 P.2d 488 (Nev. 1976) 
Initiative petition Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Cirac v. Lander County, 
602 P.2d 1012 (Nev. 1979) 
Initiative petition Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
State Emps. Ass’n v. Lau, 
877 P.2d 531 (Nev. 1994) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
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Citizens for Honest & 
Responsible Gov’t v. Heller, 
11 P.3d 121 (Nev. 2000) 
Recall petition Disenfranchised Majority (mentioned) 
Rogers v. Heller, 
18 P.3d 1034 (Nev. 2001) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. 
Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 
100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004) 
Initiative petition Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Miller v. Burk, 
188 P.3d 1112 (Nev. 2008) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Strickland v. Waymire, 
235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
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APPENDIX E 
Colorado Democracy Canon Cases 
 
Case Type of Dispute Result 
Reference to 
Democracy Canon 
Kellogg v. Hickman, 
21 P. 325 (Colo. 1889) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
Allen v. Glynn, 
29 P. 670 (Colo. 1892) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
Young v. Simpson, 
42 P. 666 (Colo. 1895) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Dickinson v. Freed, 
55 P. 812 (Colo. 1898) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
Nicholls v. Barrick, 
62 P. 202 (Colo. 1900) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 
94 P. 294 (Colo. 1908) 
Registration Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Littlejohn v. People ex rel. 
Desch, 121 P. 159 (Colo. 1912) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Pease v. Wilkin, 
127 P. 230 (Colo. 1912) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Benson v. Gillespie, 
161 P. 295 (Colo. 1916) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Stephen v. Lail, 
248 P. 1012 (Colo. 1926) 
Candidate access Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
City of Aspen v. Howell, 
459 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1969) 
Registration Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Colo. Project–Common Cause v. 
Anderson, 495 P.2d 220 (Colo. 
1972) 
Initiative petition Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Meyer v. Putnam, 
526 P.2d 139 (Colo. 1974) 
Registration Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Chesser v. Buchanan, 
568 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1977) 
Registration Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Moore v. MacFarlane (In re 
Interrogatories of the U.S. Dist. 
Court Pursuant to Rule 21.1), 
642 P.2d 496 (Colo. 1982) 
Registration Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Erickson v. Blair, 
670 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1983) 
Vote counting Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Romero v. Sandoval, 
685 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1984) 
Candidate access Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
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Moran v. Carlstrom, 
775 P.2d 1176 (Colo. 1989) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Comm. for Better Health Care 
for All Colo. Citizens v. Meyer, 
830 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1992) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised 
Majority (mentioned); 
dissent (followed) 
Meyer v. Lamm, 
846 P.2d 862 (Colo. 1993) 
Vote counting Split 
Majority (followed); 
dissent (rejected) 
McClellan v. Meyer, 
900 P.2d 24 (Colo. 1995) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Concurrence (followed) 
Fabec v. Beck, 
922 P.2d 330 (Colo. 1996) 
Initiative petition Enfranchised Majority (followed) 
Buckley v. Chilcutt, 
968 P.2d 112 (Colo. 1998) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised 
Majority (rejected); 
dissent (followed) 
Kuhn v. Williams, 
418 P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018) 
Initiative petition Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
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APPENDIX F 
Post-2000 Democracy Canon Decisions 
 
State Case Name 
Type of 
Dispute 
Result 
Reference to 
Democracy 
Canon 
Category 1:  Democracy Canon Codified 
CA Howard Jarvis Taxpayers 
Ass’n v. Padilla, 
363 P.3d 628 (Cal. 2016) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Cal. Cannabis Coal. v. 
City of Upland, 401 P.3d 
49 (Cal. 2017) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
IA Taylor v. Cent. City Cmty. 
Sch. Dist., 733 N.W.2d 
655 (Iowa 2007) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
KS Richards v. Schmidt, 56 
P.3d 274 (Kan. 2002) 
Petitions Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Schmidt v. 
City of Wichita, 367 P.3d 
282 (Kan. 2016) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
MA — — — — 
NE Pony Lake Sch. Dist. 30 v. 
State Comm. for the 
Reorganization of Sch. 
Dists., 710 N.W.2d 609 
(Neb. 2006) 
Petitions Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
City of North Platte v. 
Tilgner, 803 N.W.2d 469 
(Neb. 2011) 
Initiative Disenfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
NV Citizens for Honest & 
Responsible Gov’t v. 
Heller, 11 P.3d 121 (Nev. 
2000) 
Recall petition Disenfranchised 
Majority 
(mentioned) 
Rogers v. Heller, 18 P.3d 
1034 (Nev. 2001) 
Initiative 
petition 
Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. 
v. Nevadans for Sound 
Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 
2004) 
Initiative 
petition 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Miller v. Burk, 188 P.3d 
1112 (Nev. 2008) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
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Strickland v. Waymire, 
235 P.3d 605 (Nev. 2010) 
Initiative 
petition 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
NJ In re Gray-Sadler, 753 
A.2d 1101 (N.J. 2000) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
N.J. Democratic Party, 
Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 
1028 (N.J. 2002) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
In re Contest of Nov. 8, 
2005 Gen. Election for the 
Office of Mayor of 
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 
934 A.2d 607 (N.J. 2007) 
Election 
contest 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); 
concurrence 
(followed) 
Comm. to Recall Robert 
Mendez from the Office 
of U.S. Senator v. Wells, 7 
A.3d 720 (N.J. 2010) 
Recall petition Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
In re Contest of Nov. 8, 
2011, Gen. Election of 
Office of N.J. Gen. 
Assembly, 40 A.3d 684 
(N.J. 2012) 
Election 
contest 
Unclear Dissent (followed) 
Tumpson v. Farina, 95 
A.3d 210 (N.J. 2014) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
NY Gross v. Albany Cty. Bd. 
of Elections, 819 N.E.2d 
197 (N.Y. 2004) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised 
Majority (rejected); 
dissent (followed) 
Panio v. Sunderland, 824 
N.E.2d 488 (N.Y. 2005) 
Vote counting Both 
Majority 
(followed); dissent 
(rejected) 
OR Kucera v. Bradbury, 97 
P.3d 1191 (Or. 2004) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
SC Broadhurst v. City of 
Myrtle Beach Election 
Comm’n, 537 S.E.2d 543 
(S.C. 2000) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Odom v. Town of McBee 
Election Comm’n, 831 
S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 2019) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
SD — — — — 
UT Adams v. Swensen, 108 
P.3d 725 (Utah 2005) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
VT — — — — 
WI Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. 
Bd. of Canvassers, 677 
N.W.2d 599 (Wis. 2004) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
2002 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
League of Women Voters 
of Wis. Educ. Network, 
Inc. v. Walker, 851 
N.W.2d 302 (Wis. 2014) 
Voter 
eligibility 
Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Category 2:  Rejection or Disregard of Democracy Canon 
AL Fluker v. Wolff, 46 So. 3d 
942 (Ala. 2010) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
AK N.W. Cruiseship Ass’n of 
Alaska, Inc. v. State, 145 
P.3d 573 (Alaska 2006) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Edgmon v. State, 152 P.3d 
1154 (Alaska 2007) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Mjos, 179 
P.3d 941 (Alaska 2008) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Miller v. Treadwell, 245 
P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Nageak v. Mallott, 426 
P.3d 930 (Alaska 2018) 
Vote counting Both 
Majority 
(followed) 
Dodge v. Meyer, 444 P.3d 
159 (Alaska 2019) 
Registration Both 
Majority 
(followed) 
CT Gonzalez v. Surgeon, 937 
A.2d 13 (Conn. 2007) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Bysiewicz v. Dinardo, 6 
A.3d 726 (Conn. 2010) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Butts v. Bysiewicz, 5 A.3d 
932 (Conn. 2010) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Arras v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 
No. 14, 125 A.3d 172 
(Conn. 2015) 
Vote counting Unclear 
Majority 
(followed) 
Keeley v. Ayala, 179 A.3d 
1249 (Conn. 2018) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
IN Pabey v. Pastrick, 816 
N.E.2d 1138 (Ind. 2004) 
Election 
contest 
Both 
Majority 
(followed) 
Burke v. Bennett, 907 
N.E.2d 529 (Ind. 2009) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
White v. Ind. Democratic 
Party, 963 N.E.2d 481 
(Ind. 2012) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
LA Adkins v. Huckabay, 755 
So. 2d 206 (La. 2000) 
Vote counting Disenfranchise 
Majority 
(followed) 
Russell v. Goldsby, 780 
So. 2d 1048 (La. 2000) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
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Becker v. Dean, 854 So. 
2d 864 (La. 2003) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); dissent 
(rejected) 
ME — — — — 
MI In re Request for 
Advisory Op. Regarding 
Constitutionality of 2005 
PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444 
(Mich. 2007) 
Registration Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
MS Wesley v. Wash. Cty. 
Democratic Exec. Comm., 
235 So. 3d 1379 (Miss. 
2017) 
Election 
contest 
Unclear 
Majority 
(followed) 
NH In re McDonough, 816 
A.2d 1022 (N.H. 2003) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Concurrence 
(followed) 
NM State ex rel. League of 
Women Voters v. Herrera, 
203 P.3d 94 (N.M. 2009) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
NC — — — — 
RI — — — — 
VA — — — — 
WV State ex rel. Bowling v. 
Greenbrier Cty. Comm’n, 
575 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va. 
2002) 
Vote counting Both 
Majority 
(followed) 
Tillis v. Wright, 619 
S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 2005) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Category 3:  Semi–Democracy Canon Codified 
AZ Ross v. Bennett, 265 P.3d 
356 (Ariz. 2011) 
Recall Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
AR Republican Party of 
Garland Cty. v. Johnson, 
193 S.W.3d 248 (Ark. 
2004) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Populist Party of Ark. v. 
Chesterfield, 195 S.W.3d 
354 (Ark. 2004) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
CO Herpin v. Head (In re 
Title, Ballot Title & 
Submission Clause, 
Summary for 1999–2000 
No. 255), 4 P.3d 485 
(Colo. 2000) 
Initiative Unclear 
Majority 
(followed) 
Kuhn v. Williams, 418 
P.3d 478 (Colo. 2018) 
Initiative 
petition 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
2004 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
DE — — — — 
FL Palm Beach Cty. 
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 
772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 
2000) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 
1243 (Fla. 2000) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); dissent 
(rejected) 
Wright v. City of Miami 
Gardens, 200 So. 3d 765 
(Fla. 2016) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
GA — — — — 
HI Peroutka v. Cronin, 179 
P.3d 1050 (Haw. 2008) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
ID — — — — 
IL Goodman v. Ward, 948 
N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 2011) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
KY 
Heleringer v. Brown, 104 
S.W.3d 397 (Ky. 2003) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); 
concurrences 
(followed) 
Hardin v. Montgomery, 
495 S.W.3d 686 (Ky. 
2016) 
Election 
contest 
Both 
Majority 
(followed) 
MD Abrams v. Lamone, 919 
A.2d 1223 (Md. 2007) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Doe v. Montgomery Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 
342 (Md. 2008) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Fraternal Order of Police 
Lodge 35 v. Montgomery 
County, 80 A.3d 686 (Md. 
2013) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
MN 
Erlandson v. Kiffmeyer, 
659 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 
2003) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); 
concurrence 
(followed) 
Coleman v. Ritchie, 758 
N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 2008) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised 
Concurrence 
(followed) 
Coleman v. Ritchie, 762 
N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 2009) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
League of Women Voters 
Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 
N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 2012) 
Registration Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
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MO Lewis v. Gibbons, 80 
S.W.3d 461 (Mo. 2002) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised 
Majority (rejected); 
dissent (followed) 
Comm. for a Healthy 
Future, Inc. v. Carnahan, 
201 S.W.3d 503 (Mo. 
2006) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Weinschenk v. State, 203 
S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) 
Registration Enfranchised Dissent (followed) 
MT Montanans Opposed to I-
166 v. Bullock, 285 P.3d 
435 (Mont. 2012) 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Concurrence 
(followed) 
ND Thompson v. Jaeger, 788 
N.W.2d 586 (N.D. 2010) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Zaiser v. Jaeger, 822 
N.W.2d 472 (N.D. 2012) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
OH In re Election Contest of 
Dec. 14, 1999, 744 N.E.2d 
745 (Ohio 2001) 
Election 
contest 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Oster v. 
Lorain Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 756 N.E.2d 649 
(Ohio 2001) 
Petition Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Brady v. 
Blackwell, 857 N.E.2d 
1181 (Ohio 2006) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised 
Majority (rejected); 
concurrence 
(rejected) 
State ex rel. Colvin v. 
Brunner, 896 N.E.2d 979 
(Ohio 2008) 
Registration Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Myles v. 
Brunner, 899 N.E.2d 120 
(Ohio 2008) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Skaggs v. 
Brunner, 900 N.E.2d 982 
(Ohio 2008) 
Vote counting Disenfranchise 
Majority 
(followed); 
concurrence 
(followed) 
State ex rel. 
LetOhioVote.org v. 
Brunner, 916 N.E.2d 462 
(Ohio 2009) 
Initiative Enfranchises 
Majority 
(followed) 
State ex rel. Linnabary v. 
Husted, 8 N.E.3d 940 
(Ohio 2014) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
State ex rel. Espen v. 
Wood Cty. Bd. of 
Initiative Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
2006 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Elections, 110 N.E.3d 
1222 (Ohio 2017) 
Ohio Renal Ass’n v. 
Kidney Dialysis Patient 
Prot. Amendment Comm., 
111 N.E.3d 1139 (Ohio 
2018) 
Initiative Disenfranchise Majority (rejected) 
OK — — — — 
PA In re Nomination of 
Flaherty, 770 A.2d 327 
(Pa. 2001) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
In re 2003 Gen. Election 
for the Office of 
Prothonotary, 849 A.2d 
230 (Pa. 2004) 
Election 
contest 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
In re Canvass of Absentee 
Ballots of Nov. 4, 2003 
Gen. Election, 843 A.2d 
1223 (Pa. 2004) 
Vote counting Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
Shambach v. Bickhart, 
845 A.2d 793 (Pa. 2004) 
Vote counting Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); dissent 
(rejected) 
In re Nader, 858 A.2d 
1167 (Pa. 2004) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed); 
concurrence 
(followed) 
In re Paulmier, 937 A.2d 
364 (Pa. 2007) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
In re James, 944 A.2d 69 
(Pa. 2008) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
In re Nomination of 
Gales, 54 A.3d 855 (Pa. 
2012) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
In re Beyer, 115 A.3d 835 
(Pa. 2015) 
Candidate 
access 
Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
In re Vodvarka, 140 A.3d 
639 (Pa. 2016) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Reuther v. Del. Cty. 
Bureau of Elections, 205 
A.3d 302 (Pa. 2019) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
TN Halbert v. Shelby Cty. 
Election Comm’n, 31 
S.W.3d 246 (Tenn. 2000) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
TX — — — — 
WA — — — — 
2020] THE DEMOCRACY CANON 2007 
WY Geringer v. Bebout, 10 
P.3d 514 (Wyo. 2000) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Dissent (followed) 
Murphy v. State 
Canvassing Bd., 12 P.3d 
677 (Wyo. 2000) 
Candidate 
access 
Enfranchised 
Majority 
(followed) 
Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 
P.3d 1050 (Wyo. 2004) 
Initiative Disenfranchised Majority (rejected) 
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APPENDIX G 
Latitudinal Review Summary 
 
 
All States 
Category 1:  
Codified 
Category 2:  
Rejected 
Category 3:  
Ambiguous 
Enfranchised 49 (49%) 12 (46%) 11 (46%) 26 (52%) 
Disenfranchised 41 (41%) 12 (46%) 7 (29%) 22 (44%) 
Other 10 (10%) 2 (8%) 6 (25%) 2 (4%) 
Total 100 26 24 50 
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APPENDIX H 
Cases Citing Codified Democracy Canon After 1960 
 
State Case Name Result 
Applicable to All Election Provisions 
Nebraska — — 
Nevada LaPorta v. Broadbent, 
530 P.2d 1404 (Nev. 1975) 
Enfranchised 
Long v. Swackhamer, 
538 P.2d 587 (Nev. 1975) 
Enfranchised 
Eller Media Co. v. City of Reno, 
59 P.3d 437 (Nev. 2002) 
Enfranchised 
Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Nevadans for 
Sound Gov’t, 100 P.3d 179 (Nev. 2004) 
Enfranchised 
Lueck v. Teuton, 219 P.3d 895 (Nev. 2009) Enfranchised 
Oregon Kucera v. Bradbury, 
97 P.3d 1191 (Or. 2004) 
Disenfranchised 
Wisconsin Clapp v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
124 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1963) 
Enfranchised 
Gradinjan v. Boho (In re Chairman in Town 
of Worcester), 139 N.W.2d 557 (Wis. 1966) 
Disenfranchised 
Lanser v. Koconis, 
214 N.W.2d 425 (Wis. 1974) 
Enfranchised 
Beckstrom v. Kornsi, 
217 N.W.2d 283 (Wis. 1974) 
Other 
State ex rel. Ahlgrimm v. State Elections 
Bd., 263 N.W.2d 152 (Wis. 1978) 
Disenfranchised 
McNally v. Tollander, 
302 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 1981) 
Other 
Roth v. LaFarge Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Canvassers, 677 N.W.2d 599 (Wis. 2004) 
Enfranchised 
Applicable to Specific Election Provision 
California — — 
Iowa — — 
Kansas — — 
Massachusetts — — 
New Jersey Lesniak v. Budzash, 
626 A.2d 1073 (N.J. 1993) 
Other 
Holloway v. Byrne, 
874 A.2d 504 (N.J. 2005) 
Enfranchised 
New York — — 
2010 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
South Carolina Knight v. State Bd. of Canvassers, 
374 S.E.2d 685 (S.C. 1988) 
Enfranchised 
South Dakota Thoms v. Andersen, 
235 N.W.2d 898 (S.D. 1975) 
Other 
Larson v. Locken, 
262 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 1978) 
Disenfranchised 
Pankhurst v. New Effington Indep. Sch. 
Dist. No. 54-3 (In re Election Contest as to 
Reorganization of New Effington Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 54-3), 462 N.W.2d 185 (S.D. 
1990) 
Enfranchised 
Duffy v. Mortenson, 
497 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1993) 
Enfranchised 
McIntyre v. Wick, 
558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1996) 
Other 
Becker v. Pfeifer, 
588 N.W.2d 913 (S.D. 1999) 
Enfranchised 
Utah Adams v. Swensen, 
108 P.3d 725 (S.D. 2005) 
Enfranchised 
Vermont — — 
 
